

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

BY
ALFRED L. P. DENNIS

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-111

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA
1923

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS

Note.—The University of California Publications are offered in exchange for the publications of learned societies and institutions, universities and libraries. Complete lists of all the publications of the University will be sent upon request. For sample copies, lists of publications or other information, address the Manager of the University Press, Berkeley, California, U. S. A. All matter sent in exchange should be addressed to The Exchange Department, University Library, Berkeley, California, U. S. A.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS—DAVID P. BARROWS, EDWIN LONDON, F. M. RUSSELL, Editors.

Volume 1. 1923.

1. DENNIS—The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 111 pages... .. \$1.50

HISTORY—HERBERT E. BOLTON, WILLIAM A. MORRIS, J. J. VAN NOSTRAND, Jr., Editors.

Volume 1. 1911-1914.

Studies in American History. 406 pages. Cloth..... 3.00

Volume 2. 1914.

MARSHALL—A History of the Western Boundary of the
Louisiana Purchase, 1819-1841. xiii + 206 pages, 30
maps. Cloth 2.00

Volume 3. 1915.

BOLTON—Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century: Studies
in Spanish Colonial History and Administration.
x + 501 pages, 12 maps and plans. Cloth..... 3.50

Volume 4. 1916-17.

MYRES—Influence of Anthropology on the Course of Political
Science. 81 pages..... .75

VAN NOSTRAND—Reorganization of Spain by Augustus.
72 pages..... .75

TEGGART—Prolegomena to History: The Relation of His-
tory to Literature, Philosophy, and Science. 140 pages 1.50

PUTNAM—California: The Name. 73 pages..... .75

Volume 5. 1916.

PRIESTLEY—José de Gálvez, Visitor-General of New Spain.
xiv + 449 pages, 7 illustrations. Cloth..... 3.00

Volume 6. 1917.

GITTINGER—Formation of the State of Oklahoma (1803-
1906). xii + 256 pages, 5 maps. Cloth..... 2.00

Volume 7. 1918.

DAVIDSON—The Northwest Company. 349 pages, 5 maps.
Cloth 3.00

Volume 8. 1918.

CHAPMAN—Catalogue of Materials in the Archivo General
de Indias for the History of the Pacific Coast and the
American Southwest. v + 755 pages. Cloth..... 5.50

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

BY

ALFRED L. P. DENNIS

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Vol. 1, No 1, pp 1-111
Issued May 19, 1923

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I THE ALLIANCE OF 1902	PAGE
1 Present Status of the Alliance	1
2 Negotiations of the Treaty of 1902	3
3. Standing of the Alliance	7
4 The Treaty and European Politics	13
CHAPTER II THE ALLIANCE AT WORK, 1902-10	
1 The Russo-Japanese War and Japanese Policies	19
2 The Diplomatic Revolution in Europe and the Stakes in the Great Game— Morocco and Korea	21
3 The Treaty of Portsmouth and the Alliance of 1905	22
4 The Anglo-Russian Entente and Russo-Japanese Treaties	28
CHAPTER III. THE PRESENT TREATY OF 1911 AND THE WORLD WAR	
1 Circumstances and Terms of the Renewed Alliance, 1911	32
2 The Imperial Conference of 1911 and the Renewal of the Alliance	34
3 Reception of the Treaty	37
4. The Dominions and Japan	38
5 The Allies and the Chinese Revolutions, 1911-13	41
6 Japan's Entry into the War, 1914	43
7 Entry of China into the War, 1917	46
8. Japanese Agreements with Russia and the United States	50
9 Japan in Siberia	52
CHAPTER IV THE ALLIANCE TODAY, 1919-1921	
1 American Opinion and the Alliance	55
2 Great Britain and War with the United States	58
3 The Alliance and Opinion in China	62
4 Japan and the Alliance	64
5 The British Empire in Asia and the Alliance	68
6 "The Imperial Conference" of 1921 and the Washington Conference	71
CHAPTER V THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND JAPAN	
1. The Alliance and the Problem of the Pacific	81
2 The Alliance and England	87
3. Japanese Alarms and Uncertainties	91
4. Criticism of the Alliance	93
APPENDIX I. THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATIES	
A Treaty of 1902	99
B Treaty of 1905	101
C. Treaty of 1922	103
APPENDIX II THE FOUR POWER PACT	
Declaration accompanying the above Four-Power Treaty	107
A Treaty between the same Four Powers, supplementary to the above, signed February 6, 1922	108
Senate Reservation	109
APPENDIX III. READING LIST	
	110

NOTE

Originally I was asked to prepare this short history of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for publication prior to the meeting of the Conference on Limitation of Armament and Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. Its publication was then held in abeyance for reasons which were apparently sufficient last November, but which no longer exist.

It appears now just as it was written in October, 1921, but to the appendix is added the final text of the Four Power Treaty which was signed during the Washington Conference and which itself provides for the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Such a brief historical survey of the origin and development of that alliance leads directly to the heart of world politics during a crowded and tumultuous period. The three successive treaties which formed that unusual combination were essential parts in the history of politics and of international relations in the Far East for twenty years. The ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance will therefore mark the conclusion of a definite stage in modern diplomatic history. It has lasted during two great wars, and the arrangements for its termination came to a head as the danger of a third great war was absorbed by a strong and significant endeavor to preserve the peace of the world.

Although the alliance was not directed against the United States, its history became a part of our foreign relations, and its disappearance is an important event in American diplomatic history, whose full meaning none of us can foretell. In this sense, therefore, this essay is a brief summary of documents and of events which touch vitally the course of American foreign policy.

During the last six months we have watched the success of that policy in promoting better international relations. Particularly the changes in Japanese diplomatic methods which have been already apparent may be welcome evidence that Japan is finding by international cooperation a clearer way to peace and security. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has had an unwholesome biography, and its disappearance will make for healthier relations between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan.

The world is sick of the old diplomacy of which the alliance was such a marked example. If I have written an indictment of that diplomacy, I hope that it is also an obituary.

A. L. P. D.

WILLIAMSTOWN, MASS.
August 23, 1922

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

BY

ALFRED L P DENNIS

CHAPTER I

THE ALLIANCE OF 1902

1. PRESENT STATUS OF THE ALLIANCE

The first treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Japan was signed in London on January 30, 1902, by Lord Lansdowne, British Foreign Secretary, and Count Hayashi, the Japanese Minister. The alliance was renewed with several important changes on August 12, 1905, and on July 13, 1911, the third and present version of this agreement was concluded. This treaty of 1911 is now in effect, and the question of its renewal or modification has become of immense importance in connection with the agenda of the forthcoming Conference at Washington on the Limitation of Armament and Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. The particular reason why the matter of renewal is now before the British Empire and Japan is to be found in the language of Article VI of the treaty of 1911, which reads as follows:

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.¹

This article is based exactly on Article VIII of the treaty of 1905² and both of these articles are in large part repetition of Article VI of the first treaty of 1902, with the exception that in the first document

¹ Written October, 1921

² J. V. A. MacMurray, *Treaties and agreements with and concerning China, 1894-1919* (New York, 1921), I, 901, 2 vols.

² MacMurray, I, 516-518.

the agreement was to remain in force for at least five years from the date of signature, instead of for at least ten years as in the two later treaties.

But there has been some confusion in the mind of the public as to the date at which a renewal or denunciation of the alliance might be necessary. This was due chiefly to the fact that, on July 8, 1920, Great Britain and Japan jointly notified the League of Nations that they wished to bring their agreement of 1911 to a form which would be not inconsistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations as embodied in the Treaty of Versailles. This notification was in no sense a denunciation of the treaty of alliance which remained effective. A year later the two governments, on July 7, 1921, called attention to this continuation of the treaty by a second note to the League, adding

Pending further action, that they are agreed that if any situation arises whilst the Agreement remains in force in which the procedure prescribed by the terms of the Agreement is inconsistent with the procedure prescribed by the Covenant of the League of Nations then the procedure prescribed by the said Covenant shall be adopted and shall prevail over that prescribed by the Agreement.

Further to clear the matter, the Lord Chancellor gave a legal opinion last July, at the time of the Imperial Conference in London, when the renewal of the treaty was under discussion. He said that, any opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, the alliance was still in being. Only to this extent and in this fashion has there been any official comment on the exact terms of the treaty of 1911.

The duration of the treaty is therefore now indefinite. It may run in perpetuity until one year from some future date on which it may be denounced by either Great Britain or Japan. Otherwise it is self-continuing till it may be superseded by some other agreement, or be modified in view of the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, or be renewed in a fourth document. In connection with this whole matter of renewal or expiration of the treaty, as originally suggested for July, 1921, the fact that a British Imperial Conference was to be held in London in the same month is of importance. At this conference representatives of the Dominions and of India were to consult with representatives of the British Cabinet on matters of Imperial interest. Undoubtedly this fact had considerable influence in delaying the settlement of the question of the treaty; and the joint action of the two governments, by this note of July 7, 1921, indicated

still further postponement of any formal decision to denounce or renew the treaty. The conference of last July adjourned without announcement regarding the matter. In view of this situation and in view of the Washington Conference, the whole question of renewal has become a matter of interest to the world at large. The United States, however, was not at any time a party to the negotiation of this treaty or of its two predecessors, and the coincidence of interest here involved does not arise because of any formal action on the part of the United States.

In any discussion of the present treaty it is first necessary to consider the occasions and provisions of the two prior treaties, and in particular to review briefly the general conditions which prevailed at the time when the three successive agreements were concluded. Treaties are living things subject in interpretation and enforcement to inevitable alteration due to facts and events which are not necessarily embodied in any written document. This is particularly true in connection with the treaty of alliance, for, as Mr. Ozaki, lately Japanese Minister of Justice, in defending the Anglo-Japanese agreement, said in 1916. "The Alliance should not be left inactive and unchanged with changing conditions; and politicians and leaders of thought must at all times endeavor to maintain and keep the usefulness of the Alliance abreast of the times." The written word of the treaty remains; but in any case its application, whether direct or indirect, and its significance may have vastly altered as political conditions and policies have altered with the course of events. Certainly such changes have effect when we come to consider the complicated and entangled question of armaments. For in the main, armaments are determined by political and economic policies. In view of the immense and worldwide issues which are now involved in the field of international relations, the Conference on the Limitation of Armament must inevitably consider, almost as a primary duty, the scope and significance of policies, which may or may not be embodied in solemn treaties, yet which are themselves responsible for present problems of armament.

2. NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF 1902

The alliance is scarcely twenty years old; but so many things have happened in that time that it is important first to note circumstances connected with the negotiation of the treaty of 1902. The good relations of England and Japan had already been strengthened by the

negotiation, in 1894, of a new commercial treaty. This gave equality of treatment for the subjects of each of the two powers and provided that, in 1899, British extraterritoriality should end in Japan. The United States had recognized these ideas in principle as far back as 1878, but England was the first European country to recognize by an effective treaty Japan's position in the comity of nations.³ Furthermore, in 1894-95, England did not join Russia, France, and Germany in forcing Japan to revise her terms of peace after the victorious war against China. This attitude was entirely negative, for England did not, on the other hand, take any steps to assist Japan against this coalition and, indeed, advised submission to the demands for the revision of the Treaty of Shimonoseki which ended the Chinese war. Nevertheless, Japan had learned the lesson of isolation and the penalties of success. It was therefore only natural that Japanese official circles should, almost at once, begin discussion as to the wisdom of closer relations with Great Britain. Thus, in the summer of 1895, Count Hayashi inspired articles in *Jiji Shimpō* dealing with general international problems and the foreign policy of Japan. It was pointed out that:

If the continental powers, (i.e., Russia, France, and Germany) are going to continue the Alliance against her [Japan] in order to curb her just aspirations to fulfill which we have poured out life and money—then we too must endeavor to ourselves make an Alliance which shall counteract their machinations. . . . If, however, England and Japan should make an Alliance the problems of the Far East would all be settled.⁴

Three years later, in March, 1898, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, who was then head of the Colonial Office, told the Japanese Minister in London, in personal and informal fashion, that England was ready to enter into an agreement with Japan as to Far Eastern questions. In 1899, Count Hayashi, in common with Baron Kato, urged on the government the necessity of an alliance with Great Britain; and it was with this knowledge of his views that the Japanese Government sent Hayashi to London.⁵ The project of the alliance was therefore already in the air, though the discussion of it was more common in the East

³ "Japan, No. 1" (1894), *Parliamentary Papers*, XCVI; Hishida, *The international position of Japan as a great power* (New York, 1905), pp. 137 et seq.

⁴ Pooley (editor), *The secret memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi* (London, 1915), pp. 107-108. Cited as Hayashi.)

⁵ Hayashi, pp. 83-84.

than in London.⁶ Shortly after Baron Hayashi took up his post in London, the suggestion was renewed from an unexpected source, for in the spring of 1901, Baron von Eckardstein, the German *chargé d'affaires* in London, told the Japanese Minister of his personal view "that nothing would prove more effective for the maintenance of peace in the Far East than the conclusion of a triple alliance between Japan, Great Britain and Germany." Apparently von Eckardstein had frequent conversations on this same subject with members of the British Cabinet until the latter part of 1901, by which time the Anglo-Japanese negotiations had become more detailed and the possibility of the inclusion of Germany in the alliance had become decidedly less likely.⁷

In this varied fashion the way was prepared for Count Hayashi, on his own responsibility, to sound the British Government regarding the possibility of an alliance. This he did on April 17, 1901, with Lord Lansdowne. While preliminary discussions were thus taking place along these lines, Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister at Tokyo, who was then in London, told Hayashi that King Edward VII had expressed himself favorably as to an Anglo-Japanese understanding. At this time the danger had been suggested to the British Government that Japan might take up the idea of making an alliance with Russia. Indeed Hayashi had already told his government that they might use the possibility of a Russo-Japanese combination to stimulate the British toward an agreement with Japan. This threat of a possible Russian alliance was used on more than one occasion; and in this respect Prince Ito was unexpectedly useful, for while on his way around the world in 1901, he was ordered to St. Petersburg to discuss the situation with the Russian authorities. The news of this move disturbed the British and also caused great anxiety to Count Hayashi.

Originally Prince Ito had favored an Anglo-Japanese combination, but apparently, under the influence of conditions in St. Petersburg, he had changed his mind. In Tokyo there was much discussion as to the relative advantages of the two alliances; but in a Council of the Elder Statesmen before the Throne the decision was finally given in favor of continuing the negotiations at London and of signing an Anglo-Japanese treaty. These negotiations progressed much more rapidly after November; though it was not until January 28, 1902, that agreement was at last reached as to the troublesome article on

⁶ Hayashi, p. 111. ⁷ Hayashi, pp. 114 *et seq*

Korea. During these weeks the main points of discussion were the language of the preamble, the article of Korea, the question of the possible inclusion of India as a field for cooperation, and the general scope of the treaty as a whole.⁸

The British Government was particularly anxious to avoid binding England to support any Japanese aggression in Korea, and it was necessary on December 19, for Hayashi to give a formal assurance that "even if Japan should have free action in Korea the British Government might rest assured that the Japanese Government has no intention of using that freedom as a means of aggression."⁹ In the course of these conversations, Lord Lansdowne also wished to enlarge the scope of the alliance so as to include the protection of British interests in India. This proposal the Japanese were unwilling to accept and, indeed, secured the modification of the first British draft of the treaty to substitute the words "Extreme East" for "Far East," in order that there might be no doubt as to the limitation of the field of the treaty.¹⁰ On the other hand, in the first British draft of Article V there was a phrase providing that without mutual consent no other agreement should be made by either power with reference to Korea. The Japanese, however, amended the draft so as to provide that no agreement should be made with any other power which might be prejudicial to the interests of the other ally. The reason for this, as Count Hayashi points out, was that Japan did not wish to be compelled in the future to inform Great Britain at the time of negotiating with any other country in respect to China or Korea. Curiously, the British Government did not offer any objection to this amendment.¹¹

In general the agreement declared that both Great Britain and Japan were anxious to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the Extreme East, to uphold the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea, and to secure "equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations." The new allies denied any "aggressive tendencies" as to either China or Korea; but they declared the special interests of England in China and the peculiar political as well as commercial and industrial interests of Japan in Korea in addition to Japanese interests in China. Either of the allies could therefore take measures to safeguard those interests

⁸ Hayashi, Chap. IV.

¹⁰ Hayashi, p. 182

⁹ Hayashi, p. 168.

¹¹ Hayashi, pp. 180-81.

if threatened by a foreign power or by internal disturbances in either China or Korea. If, as a result, war should ensue between one of the allies and a third power the other ally was to be neutral and to try to restrain the entry of any other hostile power. If, however, a second foreign enemy should engage in the war, the two allies were to wage war together to protect their mutual interests and to make peace in common. Furthermore, neither ally was to enter into separate arrangements with another power to the prejudice of interests included in the treaty except after consultation with the other ally; and, in case of danger to these interests, the two governments were to communicate with each other fully and frankly. As we have already seen, the treaty was to remain in force for five years with the provision that in case neither power should have given notice a year before 1907 of the termination of the treaty, it was to remain in force until a year after such a notice of expiration had been given. In case the date of this expiration should fall at a time when either ally was at war, the alliance should endure until the conclusion of peace.¹²

3. STANDING OF THE ALLIANCE

We must now turn to the reception of the treaty and in general to the political circumstances which served as a background both to its negotiation and effect. The British Government, in notifying its ambassadors abroad of the signature of the treaty, declared that the alliance was "purely a measure of precaution to be invoked should occasion arise in the defense of important British interests."¹³ In the House of Commons, Lord Cranborne, in response to criticisms, declared that the agreement had not been conceived in an aggressive spirit; and in the House of Lords both Lord Lansdowne and Lord Rosebery spoke strongly in its support. But both outside of Parliament and within, the fear was expressed that the agreement was one-sided, that "the risks involved would be serious and that British policy had been placed too much at the mercy of Japan."¹⁴ On the whole the

¹²MacMurray, I, 324-25. For the full text of the three treaties, see Appendix 1

¹³"Japan, No 1" (1902), *Parliamentary Papers*, XCVI.

¹⁴*Annual Register*, 1902, p. 59; for further contemporary notice, see H N G. Bushby, *The agreement between Great Britain and Japan*, in *The Nineteenth Century and after*, LI, pp. 369-382, March, 1902; A. P. Dolliver, *Significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, in the *North American Review*, CLXXIV, 594-605 (May, 1902); A. Maurice Low, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, in *The Forum* XXXIII, 196-206 (April, 1902); A. Stead, *The Anglo-Japanese agreement from the Japanese point of view*, in the *Contemporary Review*, LXXXI, 437-445 (March, 1902).

secret of the negotiations had been well kept and there was therefore great surprise at the news of the treaty, whose full possibilities were then scarcely appreciated by an unprepared public. Even the *London Times* devoted most of its comments to China and delivered a weighty lecture on the opportunity which the alliance now afforded to China to set her house in order. The treaty was in accord with American purposes in the Far East and these ideas as to China's integrity and independence and the peaceful development of equal economic opportunity now received a "solemn consecration." It was not a threat to any other power for "by giving precision to the conservative aims of British and Japanese policy and by combining and enhancing the influence of the two powers in Peking," the alliance made for "the preservation of peace in the Far East and all over the world"¹⁵

In Japan the general sense of satisfaction was voiced by the *Japan Times* of February 13, which said that every thinking Japanese felt as "one who has suddenly awakened from dreams of youthful ambitions and vague aspirations to the consciousness of the fact that he has become a grown-up person of high position, of great reputation, and with a consequential burden of onerous responsibilities." The treaty might provide material advantage to Japan, but above all it was flattering to national aspirations and added greatly to Japanese international prestige.

There was practically no official comment from Germany; but a summary of the Berlin press shows that it was generally assumed that the treaty was directed against Russia and as such was of exceptional political significance. The gain lay rather with England than with Japan; but Germany could afford to be indifferent at the time. In line with these comments was the action of Russia and France, who felt it necessary to issue, on March 16, a special note which clearly showed that Russia at least felt that the alliance was primarily directed against her. They declared that while the treaty upheld their own ideas as to the independence of China and Korea and Far Eastern affairs in general—

Nevertheless, being obliged themselves also to take into consideration the case in which either the aggressive action of third Powers, or the recurrence of disturbances in China, jeopardizing the integrity and free development of that Power, might become a menace to their own interests, the two allied Governments reserve to themselves the

¹⁵*London Times*, Feb. 12, 1902

right to consult in that contingency as to the means to be adopted for safeguarding those interests.

And Russia, in a further *communiqué* of March 20, stated that The principles that have guided Russian policy have remained and still remain invariable; Russia insists on the independence and integrity of China—a friendly neighboring country—as well as on that of Korea; Russia desires the maintenance of the *status quo* and the general pacification of the Far East. By the construction of the great Siberian Railway, with a branch running through Manchuria to a port always free of ice, Russia is favoring the extension, in those regions, of the commerce and industry of the whole world. Would it be in her interests actually to set up obstacles to that?¹⁶

On receipt of this note, Secretary Hay, for the United States, took occasion to comment both on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and on the Franco-Russian note, stating that the United States regarded both of these as confirmatory of the assurances which it had already received from these and other powers as to the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and of Korea and “the maintenance of complete liberty of intercourse between those countries and all nations in the matter of trade and of industry.” But Mr. Hay added:

With regard to the concluding paragraph of the Russian memorandum the government of the United States, while sharing the views therein expressed as to the continuance of the “open-door” policy against possible encroachment from whatever quarter, and while equally solicitous for the unfettered development of independent China, reserves for itself entire liberty of action should circumstances unexpectedly arise whereby the policy and interests of the United States in China and Korea might be disturbed or impaired.¹⁷

Indeed at this period there were frequent occasions when the United States protested at St. Petersburg regarding Russian plans in Manchuria as being opposed to the rights of American citizens. However, in 1902 the United States had already taken pains to inform the Russian Government that it was totally ignorant of the Anglo-Japanese treaty until after its signature, and, furthermore, that the United States had not consulted Great Britain and Japan in connection with the American protest to Russia as to a pending convention regarding the Russo-Chinese Bank—an agreement which Mr. Hay had viewed with concern. The coincidence of dates between that protest in February and the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was therefore entirely accidental.

¹⁶MacMurray, I, 325-26.

¹⁷*Foreign relations of the United States*, 1902, p. 931.

On the whole, American public opinion was rather favorable to the treaty of alliance, though highly placed diplomats differed radically as to its ultimate bearing on peace and war in the Far East. It was a period of cordiality with England, the Hay-Paunceforte Canal Treaty had been signed, and there was substantial agreement between the two governments in their endeavors to protect China from Russian aggression. But inevitably the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was likely to affect in one way or another the American policy of the "Open Door" as it had grown to formulation and as it was destined to develop in the future. From a very early period in the history of our relations with the Far East, the United States has maintained the principles of coöperation and fair play. The Hay doctrine, as laid down in 1899, was therefore founded on the consistent purposes of the United States, namely, "reciprocity, integrity of Chinese territory, and cooperation with other treaty powers."¹⁸ As is well known, on September 6, 1899, Mr. Hay asked assurances from Germany and other powers that each power within its "respective sphere of whatever influence"—

First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory it may have in China

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said "sphere of interest" (unless they be "free ports"), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such "sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances.¹⁹

In view of the Boxer uprising in 1900, Mr. Hay took a step further and declared that it was the intention of the United States in coöperation with the other powers to restore order in China, to seek for a policy of peace in order to secure her territorial and administrative entity, to "protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial

¹⁸Anderson and Hershey, *Handbook of the diplomatic history of Europe, Asia and Africa, 1870-1914* (Washington, 1918), p. 244.

¹⁹*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899*, p. 129.

trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.' ²⁰ This policy was defined in a circular note to the powers on July 3, 1900, and is therefore the basis of future discussion and definition on the part of the United States.²¹ The occasion was particular but the appeal and the authority were general.

The Open Door was scarcely a doctrine of international law nor was it embodied in any formal treaty at that time. Rather was it a notice to the world to prevent further extensions of ownership or control on the part of foreign powers in China, and as such it has not lost in value and importance. Equality of economic opportunity in the Far east and the integrity of China are part and parcel of American Far Eastern policies. These principles are entirely in line with the traditional international conceptions of the United States. Their foundation is to be found in the earliest records of our diplomatic policy, whether with China or with other governments. There is therefore clear insight and special significance in the words of Admiral Mahan:

Just how far the maintenance of the Open Door may carry the interested nations to decisive action, in support of the integrity of the Chinese Empire, remains to be seen. Overt action, as distinct from latent power to act, will be necessary only in case some among

²⁰ *Idem*, 1900, p. 319.

²¹ "In this critical posture of affairs in China it is deemed appropriate to define the attitude of the United States as far as present circumstances permit this to be done. We adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857, of peace with the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and of protection of lives and property of our citizens by all means guaranteed under extraterritorial treaty rights and by the law of nations. If wrong be done to our citizens we propose to hold the responsible authors to the uttermost accountability. We regard the condition at Peking as one of virtual anarchy, whereby power and responsibility are practically devolved upon the local provincial authorities. So long as they are not in overt collusion with rebellion and use their power to protect foreign life and property we regard them as representing the Chinese people, with whom we seek to remain in peace and friendship. The purpose of the President is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other powers, first, in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the empire and recurrence of such disasters. It is, of course, too early to forecast the means of attaining this last result, but the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1900, p. 299

the countries concerned obtain, by positions, by predominant force, by intrigue, or by the negligence of rivals, a preponderance, destroying that balance which the Open Door requires. Equilibrium will ensure quiet. Thus the Open Door, which in principle has received the adhesion of the Western community of nations, does not stand isolated, as an unrelated doctrine, but is a positive and formulated attitude affecting, however unconsciously of its range, the general policy of contact between the East and the West.²²

The last restatement of the whole matter comes from Secretary Hughes himself in his pregnant note of July 1, 1921, to the Chinese Minister in Washington:

Your reference to the principle of the open door affords me the opportunity to assure you of this Government's continuance in its whole-hearted support of that principle, which it has traditionally regarded as fundamental both to the interests of China itself and to the common interests of all powers in China, and indispensable to the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean.

The Government of the United States has never associated itself with any arrangement which sought to establish any special rights or privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of other friendly States, and I am happy to assure you that it is the purpose of this Government neither to participate nor to acquiesce in any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of foreign interests any superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in designated regions of the territories of China, or which might seek to create any such monopoly or preference as would exclude other nationals from undertaking any legitimate trade or industry, or from participating with the Chinese Government in any category of public enterprise.²³

Unfortunately the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 and its renewal in 1905 and 1911 did not tend to give additional support to the definitions and statements which have just been quoted, for the application of those three treaties was destined to be different from and far more important than the mere declaration of intentions therein contained. In any case a wider view is necessary if we are to gain a just perspective. Thus the statement of the policy of the Open Door and the consummation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were themselves incident to the general course of events which, since 1894,

²² A. T. Mahan, *The interest of America in international conditions* (Boston, 1915), pp. 184-85. For further discussion of the Open Door, see Hornbeck, *Contemporary politics in the Far East* (New York, 1916), pp. 231 *et seq.*; Hershey, *International law and diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese war* (New York, 1906), pp. 328 *et seq.*

²³ *New York Times*, July 9, 1921.

has made the Far East a battle-ground for world policies. The old struggle between East and West was now, in the Extreme Orient, to be affected vitally by the transfer to this oriental terrain of intense European rivalries. The entire continent of Asia thus became a field on which remote and ancient European problems clamored for solution amid alien surroundings. The exact expressions of these contests were in turn themselves clearly affected by the internal Oriental factors which prevailed. In this fashion the Far Eastern question finally took its place as one of the vital economic and political problems of the world at large.

4. THE TREATY AND EUROPEAN POLITICS

The Japanese clearly realized this connection between the East and the West at the conclusion of their successful war against China, for, as we have seen, Russia, Germany, and France compelled Japan in 1895 to give up the Liaotung Peninsula, which had been acquired from China as a result of the war. This blow to Japanese ambitions was not only material and strategic but convinced the Japanese Government that sooner or later it would be necessary to return to the attempt to secure a foothold on the Asiatic continent. Thus Japanese leaders realized their problem and saw that Japan must seek an alliance with a European power and at the same time prepare for a second war. A further result of the war between China and Japan was the revelation to the world of the weakness of China. There was much talk of the so-called break-up of China; plans of partition were discussed and spheres of influence were plotted by European rivals in the East. Out of this welter of international greed the lease of Kioachow by Germany in March, 1898, was quickly followed by the lease of Port Arthur on the Liaotung Peninsula by Russia, while Great Britain secured Weihaiwei. Such events served to convince the Japanese that these acquisitions, which after all were gained by threat or force, had endangered her ultimate ambitions to be the leading power in eastern Asia. In addition to these territorial changes there were a horde of commercial concessions extracted from the Chinese Government by representatives of European countries enjoying the political support of their own governments. In the Far East, therefore, at the close of the century, there was fought a great "Battle of Concessions," which naturally made an impression on the minds of Oriental leaders.

Such exploitation of the commercial resources of China by foreigners was therefore one of the direct causes of the Boxer uprising in 1900. This for a time tended to obscure the main issues; but it also opened a way for further demands on the part of some of the governments which had intervened in China to protect the lives and interests of their own citizens. It was under these circumstances that Secretary Hay had determined that, as far as possible, the settlement of the claims arising out of the Boxer disturbances should not be utilized to invade further the proper rights and interests of China or of Americans in China. The United States was partially successful; but both in Manchuria and in Korea the Russian Government showed no intention of materially checking either its economic or its military advance.

Concession after concession and convention after convention soon showed to Japan that, despite protests and despite professions of innocence, the Russian Government was pursuing a fixed policy of aggrandizement at the expense of both China and Korea in such fashion as to block completely the major Japanese designs for the future. The treaty of alliance with England was therefore of supreme importance to Japan. Though the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 was not a direct and inevitable result of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the treaty of 1902 gave Japan an insurance policy against hostile interference by any other alliance which aimed at her isolation and defeat. If war with two hostile powers came, Japan would have the necessary aid. In any case the alliance tended to localize any such conflict in the Far East.

On the other hand, there were conditions and considerations in Europe and in other parts of Asia which give further reason and broader setting for the treaty of 1902. Indeed it is impossible to isolate the alliance; from the outset it is an affair of world-wide importance. To this view the situation of European international politics brings strong evidence. For, during the last decade of the nineteenth century, old forces were still at work, and the long rivalry between England and Russia continued. It was interwoven with the whole course of modern European diplomatic history from the days of Catherine II and of William Pitt; and during the second half of the last century the menace of Russian expansion in Asia was continually in the minds of British statesmen. In 1856, the Russian advance

toward Constantinople had been checked by England, France, Turkey, and Sardinia. Twenty years of mingled diplomacy and war won great success for Russia yet, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, England was again a moving factor in blocking the way southward to an ice-free port. During the seventies and eighties Central Asia therefore became an alternative field for Russian penetration. This rapid advance provoked much alarm regarding the safety of India; and it soon became a cardinal tenet of British foreign policy to safeguard the Indian frontier, as far as possible, by using Afghanistan both as a buffer state and as a protectorate. These checks to Russia in the Near East and in Central Asia made it perhaps only more natural that the government of the Czar should turn with greater energy and by more modern methods, such as the construction of the Siberian railway, to seek in the Far East what it had failed to secure elsewhere.

In the meantime, coincident with this later stage of Anglo-Russian relations, British policy, as shown in the occupation of Egypt, had aroused the jealousy of France. For more than twenty years the possibility of an Anglo-French conflict was also one of the major elements in world politics. Furthermore the dual alliance of France and Russia came as an added factor after 1893. Thus by the close of the century the British had to reckon with the enmity of two European powers which were also Asiatic powers.

On the other hand, Anglo-German relations during the period 1878-98 had on the whole been rather friendly, threatening questions both in Asia and in Africa had been amicably settled; and at times there had been coöperation and cordiality between the two governments. At the same time, Germany was developing a Near Eastern policy which involved the support of Turkish misrule in return for prospective railway concessions by the Sultan. In the Far East the German flag was hoisted in 1898 at Kiaochow. Thus Germany began her diplomatic ventures at the two extremities of Asia, in regions where other European powers were already involved. During these years there were various, more or less informal, conversations regarding the possibility of an Anglo-German accord; and, in spite of the German Imperial telegram of congratulation to President Kruger in 1895, the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899 saw England and Germany on fairly good terms.

Nevertheless one great result of the South African War was the revelation of the comparative isolation of England in Europe. It is true that the German Government pursued a correct attitude during the war and that various ill-defined plans for European intervention in behalf of the Boers came to naught, but the opinion of continental countries generally and in particular the bitter tone pursued by both the German and French press served as a warning to England. Under these circumstances the German Government sought to profit by the troubled situation, and, deeming the occasion proper, suggested an Anglo-German combination, which Mr. Chamberlain, as Colonial Secretary, was quite ready to extend to include the United States in order to form a triple combination which would dominate the world. Such talk, however, was deadened by the reality of events. In 1895 the Kaiser at the Isle of Wight had talked of alliances but failed to see that in the Near East he must choose between English coöperation and the support of the Sultan, the author of the Armenian massacres. Likewise in the Far East, Anglo-German accord was to receive a sharp blow. For in 1900 England and Germany had signed an agreement relative to China which stated that both powers would "direct their policies towards maintaining undiminished the territorial conditions of the Chinese Empire."²⁴ In spite of this, only a few months later, the German government declared that Manchuria was not included within this treaty and this, although the British Government had repeatedly declared that it understood Manchuria always to be included in the term "Chinese Empire."²⁵ Such a decision by Germany showed England that the Kaiser was not ready to support British views against Russia in China. At the same time, England discovered the possibilities of the new German navy bill of 1900. This program of naval expansion was alarming to England, but it did not in itself block the further discussion of an Anglo-German understanding. Only at the end of the previous year Lord Salisbury had spoken of Germany as England's "closest continental friend." Chamberlain and von Bülow had friendly talks and finally,

²⁴ MacMurray, I, 263.

²⁵ Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik, 1888-1914* (Berlin, 1916), pp. 167-173, where the view is rightly taken that this Anglo-German agreement as to China and the subsequent differences as to Manchuria constitute a turning point in the history of Anglo-German relations. Prince von Bülow was blunt enough in March, 1901, as he said emphatically: "*Auf die Mandchurei bezieht sich das deutschenglische Abkommen nicht.*"

as we have seen, von Eckardstein, early in 1901, returned to the whole matter by his personal suggestions to Count Hayashi of a triple alliance of England, Germany, and Japan. This was perhaps the fourth attempt to bring England and Germany together on the basis of a world-wide understanding. Toward the end of 1901, as the secret negotiations between Lansdowne and Hayashi were nearing a conclusion, the question came up as to whether Germany should be a third partner in the alliance. It was decided to keep the whole matter of the treaty private till it had been signed. At this stage, in November and December, the question of Anglo-German relations took new form, for Berlin was ready for an agreement with London provided it did not extend to Asiatic matters or include Tokyo. Thus such an Anglo-German alliance would scarcely assist England in Asia and would bind her to the support of Germany in other directions. Furthermore, trade competition between the two countries was increasing, and the press on both sides was indulging in bitter attacks. Nevertheless, Germany was by no means opposed to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, for she saw in it a possibility that both countries might become embroiled with Russia. This rejection of the secret German offer by England was a different matter, however, and, almost over-night, a wave of reciprocal vituperation swept over the press in England and Germany. The ostensible occasion was a sharp verbal encounter between Mr Chamberlain and Prince von Bülow, who had publicly resented Mr. Chamberlain's alleged derogatory remarks on the conduct of the German armies in 1870. This tempest in a teapot had arisen through charges and countercharges as to the behavior of British troops in the Boer War. Its real significance lay in the fact that in January, 1902, England alone signed the treaty with Japan and that the proposal for an Anglo-German agreement had fallen to the ground. Later German authorities have tried to impugn the validity of some of Hayashi's statements. They have also accused both the British and Japanese governments of giving Germany the cold shoulder and preventing her from participating in the alliance. Such a version, however, is not borne out by the facts.²⁶ It is clear, therefore, that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was not primarily based on Anglo-German rivalry but indeed

²⁶ Hayashi, p. 206; Reventlow, *op cit*, pp 178-180; Sir Valentine Chirol, in the *London Times*, September 11 and 13, 1920.

might have been at one time a possible step toward Anglo-German accord. The treaty was signed in that year because of Russian and of Japanese policies and because of the Asiatic interests of England at a time when, in Europe and elsewhere, England was isolated and needed support. Furthermore, this alliance with an Asiatic state was not foreign to British diplomatic traditions. The treaty of 1902 was by no means the first of this sort concluded by England with an Oriental government. Great Britain had at times been an ally of Turkey during the Napoleonic wars and for the Crimean War. We have only to recall the long series of previous Asiatic alliances on the part of England to realize that in the Anglo-Japanese agreement there was in 1902 no fundamental break with an historical foreign policy. For, during more than a hundred years, British safety, power, and final expansion in India have been based on the policy of alliance with Oriental states. This was also true to a limited extent as to Persia and even in Central Asia. It was largely by such means that the foundation of British rule was laid in India.²⁷

²⁷ Atchison, *Collection of treaties, engagements and sanads relating to India and neighboring countries* (Calcutta, 1892), *passim*, but note in particular VIII, 280, IX, 433; X, 37, 48; XI, 54. 11 vols.

CHAPTER II

THE ALLIANCE AT WORK, 1902-1910

1. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND JAPANESE POLICIES

The application of the treaty of 1902 to Far Eastern affairs, its renewal in 1905, and the fashion in which it received a new orientation as the result of changes outside of Asia all combine to mark a further stage in the development of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It is significant that the connection between that alliance and the politics and policies of Europe should receive special attention during the crowded years 1902-1907. In the Far East was fought the Russo-Japanese War which led to changes vital for Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. At the same time, an entirely new combination of circumstances had altered the diplomatic map of Europe. Taken together, war and diplomacy had brought about changes in international affairs and world politics that were practically revolutionary. Signs which pointed the way toward a greater and world-wide war were becoming clearer, and in the Far East their portent was noted.

It is not possible to review here the negotiations which, during 1903, had preceded the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan in February, 1904; nor do questions of international law arising in connection with the war require attention. It is enough to note that throughout the struggle Great Britain maintained the rôle of neutrality which had been assigned by the treaty of alliance. British sympathies naturally were strongly with Japan; but in spite of various violations of international law and practice by Russia and in spite of the Dogger Bank dispute, it was not necessary for Great Britain to assume an active part in the war.

It is time, however, to inquire as to Japanese ideas and policies which were so carefully protected by the treaty of alliance with England. The fact that England did not actually take part in the Russo-Japanese War does not by any means completely divorce her from the motives and results of her ally's policies. The significance

of these policies today becomes clearer because of their demonstration at the time of the first treaty, for they were based on fundamental factors involving elements of geographical location, of race, and of national life. The island position of Japan, her high birth rate, her immense pride, and her political ambitions have given special importance to her desire for economic development on the mainland and coastal islands of Asia. Formerly self-supporting, Japan, thanks to contact with the western world, is becoming dependent on outside sources of supply of raw materials essential to the economic life of a growing people. Changes in government have not destroyed the power of autocracy; national decision and direction remain in the hands of a very small group of leaders. The traditions and experience of Japan when added to modern military and naval power have given driving force and effect to these national policies, which, in turn, have been sheltered and assisted by her diplomacy. The result is seen dramatically in her speedy rise to the rank of a first-class power. The advance in Korea and the acquisition of Port Arthur, which were made immediately possible by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, were but first steps toward the domination of southern Manchuria and of eastern Mongolia. Formosa, in the south, suggested the growth of a Japanese sphere of influence on the Chinese mainland opposite, in the province of Fukien, and the recovery of the southern half of the island of Sakhalin, in the north, was to give a convenient post off the rich coast of eastern Siberia. Still later, as we shall see, came the opportunity to extend Japanese economic influence from the port of Tsingtao to the territory of Kiaochow and thus along the railway and main routes into the entire province of Shantung.

The methods of a military conqueror cleared the way for commercial penetration and, to a very limited extent, for immigration. Throughout there has been a thoroughness that is 'Prussian,' and a roughness of administration that has fostered local hatred and unrest in the new regions. These conditions have also encouraged the Japanese to extend political control and to continue military government together with the extreme evils of bureaucracy. Japan has copied some of the worst faults of the western world and fostered them by her own diplomatic methods. The process came clearly to the front as the result of the Russo-Japanese War. Today the game is played for economic supplies, vital to the industrial and military strength

of a country which can scarcely endure the full heat and burden of open international economic competition with western rivals. At home Japanese liberalism is struggling in its cradle; the ideals and aims of her ruling military and naval directorate are largely in control. To these Japanese diplomacy and financial interests have hitherto given valuable support. Meanwhile, the disorder, the corruption, and the wealth of China and of eastern Siberia are patent to the world. Japan is the immediate neighbor of both regions, and, whether directly for herself or as broker and commission agent for western interests, she has deeply bestirred herself to win enormous stakes.

2. THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION IN EUROPE AND THE STAKES IN THE GREAT GAME—MOROCCO AND KOREA

Such events and policies in the Far East were not clearly foreseen by English diplomatists in Europe when the first Japanese alliance was concluded; more immediate and nearer matters were then to the front in London and in Paris. Unfortunately, France, at the beginning of this century, was in rough water. Serious domestic controversies lessened her weight in foreign affairs at a time when the increasingly aggressive economic and military policies of Russia in the Far East were naturally affecting the vigor of Russia in Europe, and thus lowering the value of the Russian alliance to France. Added to this was the overshadowing Anglo-French rivalry at a time when England's official relations with Germany still remained friendly. Thus France was in an awkward position in 1902 on the eve of the signature of the Japanese treaty. Then came a rapid revolution in western diplomatic relations, for England and France became friends. An Anglo-French arbitration treaty was signed in 1903 to be followed by the famous agreement concluded in April, 1904. The two rivals wiped the slate clean and the Entente Cordiale became the point of departure for increasingly friendly relations between England and France. To counterbalance the loss of Egypt as a field for French economic and military penetration, England now recognized claims and desires of France in Morocco. Because of these developments and because she had not been consulted by the other powers, Germany protested against such settlement of north African affairs. Thus

came the first Moroccan crisis in 1905-06 where Germany, by threat of war, compelled an international conference at Algeceiras. It was at the height of tension on these matters in Europe that Far Eastern affairs, in the summer of 1905, also reached a critical stage. The Russo-Japanese war was coming to an end; peace negotiations were imminent; and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to receive a test which it had not encountered during the course of the fighting on land and sea. This was at a time when both Japanese victories and internal unrest in Russia relieved Germany from the danger of Russian pressure in Europe. As we have since learned by the "Willy-Nicky" correspondence, Germany had in fact encouraged Russia to press on in the face of discouragement in Asia. Indeed during 1904-1905 the Kaiser had pursued a policy of secret intrigue and negotiation with the Czar, seeking to weaken Russia in her French alliance, and later had suggested a secret and separate alliance between Germany and Russia, which would have paralyzed France and might have given Germany an opportunity to intervene in a diplomatic sense in the settlement of peace between Russia and Japan. These secret negotiations came to naught and, in connection with English support of France against German protests as to Morocco, served to demonstrate that the Anglo-French entente was a new and vital force in western Europe. At the same time this German secret support of Russia introduced the Kaiser as a possible and dangerous opponent of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.¹ All this was taking place in spite of the fact that in 1904 there had been cooperation between England and Germany in the Venezuelan blockade. But this action had aroused our just resentment in America and fortunately had proved to be both awkward and unpopular in England. Consequently any suggestions as to an Anglo-German alliance, which now would have included agreement as to both European and extra-European matters, were bound to fail. France had won her foothold in Morocco and Japan was astride Korea.

3. THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH AND THE ALLIANCE IN 1905

The outside world at large apparently did not appreciate in 1905 as the Russo-Japanese War had progressed that, though the Japanese had won spectacular successes, the advantage of time was nevertheless

¹ Cf. *Handbook of Diplomatic History*, pp. 288 *et seq.*

largely with Russia. How far this aspect of the matter was apparent to the authorities in the United States it is impossible to say; but in June, 1905, President Roosevelt made a second proposal of friendly mediation which was accepted by both of the belligerent powers. On June 26, the Japanese Minister at Washington indicated the following basis of a proposed peace with Russia: he declared that it would be necessary to place Korea entirely within the sphere of Japanese influence and for Japan to assume complete control and direction of the destiny of Korea. Manchuria was to be restored to China, as nearly as the circumstances would permit, subject to guaranties of Chinese administrative reform and good government. Port Arthur was to go to Japan in any case. The Russian Government, on the other hand, did not immediately put forward any distinct terms, but objected strenuously to the surrender of the whole of the island of Sakhalin, and absolutely refused to surrender Russian ships interned in the Far East or to pay any indemnity. The treaty of peace was signed at Portsmouth on September 5; but this fact was largely determined by events and circumstances remote from the scene of diplomatic conflict in New Hampshire.

As the summer advanced, it became evident to the Japanese delegates that it would be decidedly to their disadvantage to renew the war or to stand the strain, financial and military, which would be involved in a war of endurance. In order to avoid a deadlock it became necessary to compromise on the division of the island of Sakhalin, to forego any hope of an indemnity, and thus to avoid the appearance of fighting for money. To balance this disappointment and to preserve Japan against a war of revenge on the part of Russia, a second treaty of alliance with England was negotiated and signed at London on August 12. In other words, this second treaty of alliance between England and Japan in a sense indemnified Japan for her disappointments in connection with the negotiation of the Portsmouth treaty, and thus cleared the way for the conclusion of the war.

Both the Portsmouth and the London treaties recognized the results of the war as to Korea. By Article II of the Portsmouth treaty, the Russian authorities acknowledging "that Japan possesses in Corea paramount political, military and economical interests, engage neither to obstruct nor interfere with the measures of guidance, protection and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may

find it necessary to take in Corea.”² In corresponding fashion Article III of the Treaty of London reads as follows:

Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Corea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.³

The treaty of alliance had been kept secret until after the conclusion of peace; but in a dispatch to the British ambassadors at St. Petersburg and Paris, Lord Lansdowne, on September 6, called particular attention to Article III, saying: “The new treaty no doubt differs at this point conspicuously from that of 1902. It has, however, become evident that Corea, owing to its close proximity to the Japanese Empire and its inability to stand alone, must fall under the control and tutelage of Japan.”⁴ He also reviewed the provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth with regard to Korea and significantly added: “England has every reason to believe that similar views are held by other powers with regard to the relations which should subsist between Japan and Corea.”⁵

Under these circumstances and because of these diplomatic and emphatic statements, the recognition by other countries of the future position of Japan as regards Korea became almost inevitable. On November 22, the Japanese Government declared “relations of proximity have made it necessary for Japan to take and exercise, for reasons closely connected with her own safety and repose, a paramount interest and influence in the political and military affairs of Korea.”⁶ In view of such statements, the Korean Government, under pressure from Japan, recognized the change which was here indicated; and consequently the United States withdrew its minister at Seoul, the diplomatic representation of the United States in Korea being transferred to the American legation at Tokyo.

² MacMurray, I, 522-23.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 517.

⁴ MacMurray, I, 518-9.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 519.

⁶ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1905, p. 613.

With the passing of Korea were linked other changes in the second Anglo-Japanese treaty. The preamble was entirely recast and the objects of the new treaty were stated as follows:

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions.⁷

Article I arranged for free communication between the two powers in case the rights or interests of either were endangered. Article II involved still another change, for instead of two opponents only one was now required to bring both allies together for armed and active mutual assistance, thus:

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other power or powers either Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

Here may be seen the reaction of events in western Europe for, as we have seen, while this treaty was in negotiation Germany was attempting to humiliate France and was forcing a general conference on Morocco at Algeiras. It was impossible to tell what direction German policy might next take. It is necessary, therefore, to add to any further consideration of Anglo-Japanese relations the conclusion that Anglo-German relations were now rapidly displacing in importance Anglo-Russian rivalry as a major factor in world politics. In any event this new form of alliance might well check Russia from entering on a second war, a war of revenge.

We have already noted Article III as to Korea. In Article IV, as in the preamble, the change takes place which the British had previously urged in the negotiation of the treaty of 1902; the security of the Indian frontier is mentioned specifically as a special interest

⁷ MacMurray, I, 517.

within the scope of the alliance of 1905. In this connection Lord Roberts took occasion to warn the British public that "it would be a fatal blow to British prestige if India ever regarded her defence as dependent upon the strength of Japan."⁸ The importance of this truthful warning seems even greater today than in 1905. The other articles in the treaty provided means for the better fulfillment of the principal objects of the alliance, and the date of expiration was fixed for 1915 with the self-extending provision already noted in the first treaty. Lord Lansdowne shortly after the publication of the treaty took pains to state that there were no secret clauses in the document.⁹ This, however, makes it seem all the more likely that military and naval plans for coöperation were included in separate agreements which have not been published. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable that such documents (outside of the treaty) do not exist. They are usual corollaries to any treaty of alliance.

The treaty, when published at the end of September, received praise from all parties in England. Sir Edward Grey, for the opposition, gave it his complete approval and in a nicely calculated speech declared that the three cardinal features of British foreign policy were growing friendship and good feeling for the United States, the extended alliance with Japan "in all its aspects," and friendship with France.¹⁰ And before the year was out Sir Edward Grey was to become the new foreign secretary in the Campbell-Bannerman ministry. In general and quite rightly the renewed alliance and the peace with Russia were taken together in the mind of the public. "An integral part of our policy in the Far East," "emphatically a bulwark of peace," against the renewal of the alliance now "no one in England has a word to say,"—such were the phrases of the day.¹¹

In Japan there was considerable disappointment on the part of the public as to the failure of Japan to secure more favorable terms in the Treaty of Portsmouth. The public at large was by no means aware of the extremely serious position in which Japan was involved in mid-summer of 1905; and not even the announcement of the renewal of the alliance could remove the general impression that, by

⁸ *Annual Register*, 1905, p. 229.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

¹⁰ *Annual Register*, 1905, p. 221.

¹¹ *London Times*, September 27, 1905; Paul, "The New Alliance" *The Nineteenth Century*, October, 1905.

accepting the good offices of the United States, Japan had sacrificed her opportunity for a glorious victory. The news of peace had brought on rioting in Tokyo and in Japanese homes the picture of President Roosevelt was turned to the wall or torn down; but when the treaty of alliance was published, many large business houses and public buildings were illuminated. Some elements, nevertheless, objected to the inclusion of India in the scope of the agreement though all welcomed the exclusion of Korea.¹² The comment in the United States was in the main favorable. But in Russia there was much chagrin both over the outcome of the war and the renewal of the alliance. This, however, soon wore off in the internal crisis which led to the calling of the first Duma. Because of the concentration of public attention on these domestic matters, Russian opinion was given an opportunity to moderate its disappointment; and it was commonly said that, after all, the Japanese victories had secured for Russia her first constitutional legislature.

Curiously it was the defeat of Russia in the war that also gave strength to the idea of better Anglo-Russian relations. The idea had been in the air for some time and within two weeks after the conclusion of the Japanese alliance the London press renewed discussion of the project. It gained ground as the conference on Moroccan matters gave Sir Arthur Nicolson (now Lord Carnock), the British representative at Algceiras, opportunity to develop friendly relations with the Russians at the conference. Later he was to be British ambassador at St. Petersburg. This of course fitted in with French desires, for, though the Kaiser had been able seriously to threaten France and to compel an international meeting on Morocco, this general conference did not secure for Germany any very material advantages in 1906; and France still had to face the possibility of further German protests as to her activities in northern Africa. Under these circumstances various forces were also at work to promote better relations between Japan, the ally of England, and Russia, the ally of France. Thus both the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Anglo-French entente provided a convenient starting point for a Russo-Japanese understanding and an Anglo-Russian entente.

¹² London *Times*, September 28, 1905

4. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE TREATIES

It was clearly the duty of the Japanese to consider whether it was to their interests now to prepare for a second struggle with Russia during the course of the next decade or to attempt by diplomacy to find, if possible, a satisfactory line of approach which would provide both powers with opportunity for further development in the Far East without having recourse to arms. However, preliminary to this, came an understanding between Japan and France, the ally of Russia and the friend of England. On June 10, 1907, the two governments signed an agreement of mutual support for the preservation of peace and security in the "regions" of China and "with a view to maintaining the respective situation and the territorial rights of the two Contracting Parties in the continent of Asia."¹³ This treaty promoted the next development in better Russo-Japanese relations. The first important step taken in this direction was the signature of the open convention of July 30, 1907, which clearly proclaimed the inauguration of more friendly relations between the two countries¹⁴

Each recognized the actual territorial integrity of the other and also all rights accruing to one and the other party from the treaties, conventions, and contracts enforced between them and China. By Article II of this treaty both governments recognized the independence and territorial integrity of China and the principle of equal economic opportunity for all nations. Much more important than the open treaty was the secret agreement of the same date, which, in the first place, apparently recognized in a more distinct fashion the special interests of Japan in Korea; secondly, drew a line of demarcation in Manchuria whereby, in self-denying fashion, Japan promised not to seek railway or telegraph concessions north of a line approximate to the course of the River Nonni as it flowed east, and Russia, on the other hand, agreed to refrain from seeking railway or telegraph concessions south of that line; and thirdly, in vague fashion, Japan recognized that Russia had interests in Mongolia. The text of this treaty has never been published; but in view of subsequent references to this treaty and from other sources of information it seems highly probable that these were its chief provisions.

We can see the local significance of such a secret treaty in the very fact that, only two years after the war, Japan and Russia were

¹³ MacMurray, I, 640

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 657.

already apparently agreeing to a delimitation of areas for their respective economic penetration of Chinese territory. A wider political view may be that the treaty was in accord with the spirit of relations which were developing between London and St. Petersburg during 1906-07. Certainly the treaty was in accord with the general desire to bury the hatchet which led to the formation of the Anglo-Russian entente in 1907. This convention was signed on August 31, a month after the Russo-Japanese agreement. It was of course also in some sense a complement to the Anglo-French entente of 1904. The main provisions of this Anglo-Russian convention were: (1) the delimitation of spheres of influence in Persia—an arrangement which, from a territorial point of view, was decidedly to the advantage of Russia; (2) Russia recognized that Afghanistan was outside her sphere of interest and that the foreign relations of Afghanistan were to be conducted through British authorities and thus the political interest of England in Afghanistan was recognized as a protection to the Indian frontier; (3) both governments recognized the suzerainty of China in Tibet; and the territorial integrity of Tibet and the right of the Chinese Government to direct Tibetan foreign relations marked a self-denying position on the part of both England and Russia.¹⁵ It was in this fashion that England agreed to Russian compensation in Persia for the gains of Japan in Manchuria and that, as Japan acquired control of Korea, England also gained in a sense of greater security along the Indian frontier by her direction of Afghan foreign policy.

Only three years later Japan concluded a second convention with Russia which was also a cover for a second secret treaty. The open document merely confirmed the mutual maintenance of the *status quo* in Manchuria.¹⁶ But it is obvious by the terms of the secret treaty of 1910 that, despite Chinese protest, the two powers were guaranteeing to each other the exercise of further special powers and the protection of increasing special interests in the areas in Manchuria which had been set apart by the secret treaty of June 30, 1907. The essential provisions of this treaty of 1910 are given in a document published in the *New York American*, April 17, 1921. There is strong reason to believe that they are authentic and their intent accords with the policies of both countries at that time. Taken with

¹⁵ MacMurray, I, 674.¹⁶ MacMurray, I, 803.

the treaty of 1907 they both appear as separate agreements but as emerging under the influence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.¹⁷

As though to make the matter even plainer, a third secret treaty between Japan and Russia on June 25, 1912, further confirmed the previous agreements. It also recognized certain special interests of Japan in Inner Mongolia east of a line running north and south not far from the meridian of Peking. This treaty followed the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1911 much as the Russo-Japanese secret treaty of 1907 followed the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905. The text of the third secret convention is not as yet available, but, as though to underscore the entire matter, there is the Russian report of British approval of such agreements. For Sir Edward Grey, on learning of the political convention of 1910, was reported by the Russian ambassador in London as saying that he was "very satisfied with the step taken by the Russian government. . . . He has watched with satisfaction the development of good relations between Russia and Japan within the last three years. . . . England's political interests in the Far East consist

¹⁷ The text of the secret treaty of July 4, 1910, is printed as a part of material dealing with Russian "secret diplomacy" collated from documents in the possession of and translated by Count B von Siebert, formerly of the Russian diplomatic service. They are very badly edited by Capt. G A Schiemer for the *New York American*, but the essential terms of the treaty appear to be intact. These documents are not Bolshevik "revelations."

To conform and further develop the provisions of the Secret Treaty of June 17-30, 1907, the Russian and the Japanese governments agree to the following provisions.

ARTICLE 1 Russia and Japan recognize as the boundary of their specific spheres of interest in Manchuria the line of demarcation as defined in the supplementary article of the Secret Treaty of 1907

ARTICLE 2 The two contracting parties agree mutually to recognize their special interests in the areas set forth above. Each of them may also, each within its own sphere of interest, take such measures as shall be deemed necessary for the maintenance and protection of these interests

ARTICLE 3 Each party undertakes to place no obstacle of any kind in the way of the confirmation and future development of the special interests of the other party within the boundary lines of such spheres of interest

ARTICLE 4. Each of the contracting parties undertakes to refrain from all political action within the sphere of interest of the other party in Manchuria. Furthermore, it has been decided that Russia shall seek no privileges and concessions in the Japanese zone, and Japan none in the Russian zone, that might be injurious to the special interests of either party and that both governments are to recognize the rights acquired in their spheres of interest, as defined in Article 2 of the Public Treaty of today's date

ARTICLE 5. To ensure the working of the mutual stipulations, both parties will enter into an open and friendly exchange of opinions on all matters concerning their special interests in Manchuria. In case these special interests should be threatened, the two governments will agree on the measures that may become necessary for common action or mutual support in order to protect these interests

ARTICLE 6. The present treaty will be kept strictly secret by both governments.

in the maintenance of peace, just as her trade interests are based on the principle of the open door.'¹⁸ In such connection it is also important to recall that these were the days when Japan was also consolidating her position in Manchuria by additional treaties with China; and we must not forget that the Russo-Japanese treaty of 1910, of which Sir Edward Grey spoke, was almost in reply to the proposed neutralization of Manchurian railways as advocated by Secretary Knox for the United States. The rejection of that plan matches with the policies indicated in this brief review.

Meanwhile, the attention of Europe had been directed particularly to the course of events in the Near East where the Turkish revolution of 1908 was quickly followed by the proclamation of Bulgarian independence, the annexation of Crete to Greece, and the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria. In connection with the Bosnian crisis Germany demonstrated her readiness to support Austria-Hungary against Russian interference in Balkan affairs. The check which Russia thereby endured, together with the inability of England effectively to pursue a continental policy at this time, suggested to both Germany and Russia that, at least for the time being, mutual friendly relations might develop. Consequently, the Czar and his Foreign Secretary Sazonov agreed to an amicable adjustment as to Russian interests and German commercial plans in northern Persia, while Russia also promised not to hinder German railway plans in Turkey. On the whole, therefore, German policy had assisted in temporarily diverting Russian policies from the Balkans to Persia, and had in part wiped out the disagreeable impressions that had been created in Russia by the Bosnian crisis in the previous year. English opposition to the development of the Bagdad railway and to the far-reaching German plans for economic penetration in Turkey had also received a rebuff. Russia, on the other hand, was on increasingly good terms with Japan, and in Europe had once more shaken hands with the Kaiser. Under the circumstances, the formal annexation of Korea by Japan was scarcely noticed. England in particular, suffering from domestic, political, and economic crises, was soon also to face with France an international situation of great portent. For in 1911 came the second Moroccan crisis and the danger of war with Germany became serious. At this critical stage in world politics came the second renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

¹⁸ Quoted in Russian documents printed in *New York American*, April, 17, 1921.

CHAPTER III

THE PRESENT TREATY OF 1911 AND THE
WORLD WAR

1. CIRCUMSTANCES AND TERMS OF THE RENEWED ALLIANCE, 1911

In 1911 it was on the whole only natural that the Moroccan situation should again become acute. The Conference of Algeciras in 1906 had marked a victory for France as supported by England. However, the very fact that it had been necessary to treat the question of Morocco as an international, rather than as a French or Spanish, or even English question, had shown that Germany was able to compel the submission of the matter to general discussion. Nevertheless, Germany, in 1909, had recognized more clearly the political interests of France in Morocco, though obtaining recognition of the right of Germans to associate with Frenchmen in securing concessions in Morocco. Between 1909 and 1911 the Germans consistently pursued this matter until the so-called Agadir crisis threatened the peace of the world. Yet it was not the intention of Germany actually to force a war in 1911, but rather, through the Moroccan question, to threaten war so as to alarm England and if possible to drive a wedge between the partners of the Entente Cordiale. Furthermore, if not in Morocco, certainly in the Congo region Germany sought compensation from France. It was only with great difficulty and owing to the British accord with France in Morocco that war was averted. Germany secured certain compensation in the French Congo; but the Entente Cordiale had stood the test.

In connection, however, with all this turmoil and uncertainty regarding peace in Europe, the British Government was becoming increasingly alarmed as to German intentions. The policy of concentrating a greater part of British naval strength in home waters became essential; and, in anticipation of such possibilities, it had been decided to undertake a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in

order that the British Government might feel more completely at rest, at least with regard to the Far Eastern situation, even though the European situation might become more difficult and threatening. A second but far less important element was that with the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Russia would not be so likely to continue on such friendly relations with Germany as had followed the conference between the Kaiser and the Czar at Potsdam, in 1910. Still a third element lay in the fact that both Russia and Japan had shown intense opposition to American proposals as to the neutralization of Manchurian railways. The British had approved in principle these suggestions of Secretary Knox but, as we have seen, the plan as a whole had been finally rejected. It might be advisable, therefore, in connection with the renewal of the alliance with Japan to reaffirm the right of England to consult with Japan regarding Far Eastern affairs, if occasion should arise. Thus Great Britain might exercise a certain restraining influence on Japanese foreign policy in case of difficulties developing between Japan and the United States. For English public opinion in general, irrespective of the foreign office, was quoted strongly in favor of the maintenance of cordial relations with the United States; and in 1911 the negotiations were proceeding for a treaty of general arbitration between the two countries. On the whole, then, the course of European events from 1905 to 1911 had brought out the increasing danger of an aggressive German policy as directed against England and her associates. Hence, the third edition of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in many respects an insurance policy on the part of England against trouble in the Far East in case of an Anglo-German war.

The present treaty was therefore signed in London on July 13, 1911. Its language follows closely that of the treaty of 1905, with certain notable exceptions. In the preamble the reason given for the revision of the earlier agreement was that important changes had taken place in the situation since 1905, and that the new agreement was to respond to those changes in order to contribute to general stability and repose. As in 1905, the attack of any one power was to be the occasion of the operation of the alliance by the joint conduct of war on the part of England and Japan. The repetition of this article made even clearer the fact that a possible attack by Germany was more definitely in mind, for in 1902 an attack by two powers had

been required to bring the alliance into effect as to active military operations. Of course the hostile alliance of which England and Japan were then thinking was that of Russia and France. In the new treaty, furthermore, there was again no reference to Korea, for as noted above, Japan had annexed Korea in 1910. Thus from the point of view of international law, the long process of expansion of Japanese interests in Korea was finally completed. Specific reference to the Indian frontier was also omitted because of the Anglo-Russian entente of 1907, though in a statement of the general objects of the alliance, the maintenance of peace in India, as well as in eastern Asia, was included as in the treaty of 1905.¹⁹ Reference to the Russian war also disappeared. Otherwise the provisions of the treaty of 1905 were repeated. Article IV, however, brought an entirely new element into the situation; the United States and Great Britain were negotiating a treaty of general arbitration; and the language of Article IV was intended to exclude the possibility that, in the event of war between the United States and Japan, England or the British Empire might be compelled by other terms of the treaty of alliance to come to the assistance of Japan against the United States. The exact language of Article IV is as follows:

Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

The intent on the part of both England and Japan was plain. No one in 1911 could foresee that the United States would reject the arbitration treaty and in so doing nullify, for the time being at least, the purpose of this article. Later, as we shall see, this particular matter assumes a special significance in connection with the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921.

2. THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1911 AND THE RENEWAL OF THE ALLIANCE

The signature of the treaty came at a time when the European international situation was grave; actually it preceded by only a week the famous "Mansion House Speech" by Lloyd George which gave warning to Germany that England was prepared to stand by France

¹⁹ MacMurray, I, 901.

and to maintain the efficiency of the Entente Cordiale. A further element in the negotiation of the treaty of 1911 was the fact that since May the Imperial Conference had been in session in London. To this had come representatives of the self-governing Dominions for discussion and action on many important Imperial questions. The published records of this conference by no means indicate its significance, for, during the month of June, both at the regular sessions and in confidential meetings, the entire range of British foreign policy was explained to the Dominion representatives practically for the first time. The British Government took the other self-governing partners of the Empire into its confidence, and the reasons for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were fully explained to the ministers of the Dominions. In connection with these private conferences, the feeling of the Dominions with reference to Asiatic immigration was considered, and their acceptance and support of the alliance was therefore based on a full appreciation of the various reasons which made the alliance particularly useful and important to the empire at large. Naturally the fact that the immigration question had been also a subject of difficulty between the United States and Japan made the support of the Dominions of peculiar significance. But the expectation then was that by Article IV the United States would be practically excluded as a possible opponent to the British Empire under the scope of the treaty. Certainly in the United States there was appreciation of the fact that by the inclusion of this article a serious endeavor had been made to accommodate the purposes and necessities of the British Empire, as shown in the treaty, to the cause of Anglo-American friendship.

If we consider further the bearing of these events of June and July, 1911, we can see that the renewal of the alliance has a special quality and character reaching across the events of the last decade. This becomes even clearer and more real as the United States in this November, 1921, welcomes, as members of the British delegation to the present international conference at Washington, representatives of self-governing Dominions of the British Empire including India. The great fact of the World War is of course in part responsible for this historic event. The precedent set by the negotiations at Paris in 1919 is before us; but as far as the Anglo-Japanese treaty is concerned, the precedent for the nations of the British Empire was

set in 1911. The renewal of the alliance then became an Imperial event. For that treaty was the first British treaty of alliance on which the opinion of the Dominions was desired and their view taken. The impression then given by the frank statements of Sir Edward Grey (now Lord Grey of Falloden) remains on record, for Mr. Asquith addressing the conference reminded the Dominion premiers that they had been "admitted as it were into the interior, into the innermost parts of the Imperial household." He continued:

You will all, I am sure, remember our meeting in the Committee of Defence, when Sir Edward Grey presented his survey of the foreign policy of the Empire. That is a thing which will be stamped upon all our recollections, and I do not suppose there is one of us—I speak for myself, as I am sure you will speak for yourselves—who did not feel when that exposition of our foreign relations had been concluded that we realized in a much more intimate and comprehensive sense than we had ever done before the international position and its bearings upon the problems of Government in the different parts of the Empire itself.²⁰

Nevertheless this Imperial conference did not ask for the right to consider all treaties nor to have a guiding hand in foreign policy. A proposal which might have added a permanent Imperial advisory council to the executive machinery of the British constitution was then rejected, and this largely because it was said that such a council acting in the field of international relations and defence,

Would impair, if not altogether destroy the authority of the Government of the United Kingdom, in such grave matters, as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the maintenance of peace, or the declaration of war and, indeed, all those relations with foreign powers, necessarily of the most delicate character, which are now in the hands of the Imperial Government, subject to its responsibility to the Imperial Parliament.²¹

In other words, London was not "turning over" foreign affairs to Ottawa or Wellington; though, in point of fact, by the very frankness and liberality of the information offered to the Dominion governments, it had quickened understanding within the empire and enlisted support for the problems and policies of Downing Street. The whole matter, however, was by no means finished.²²

²⁰ *Proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1911* (Dominions, No. 7), p. 440

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

²² Hall, *The British Commonwealth of Nations* (London, 1920), pp. 148 *et seq*

3. RECEPTION OF THE TREATY

With this digression on an important subject, to which we must return later, the treaty of alliance once more claims direct attention. We have analyzed its terms. What of its reception and the tests it was destined to receive in the crowded years of 1911-14? In the United States there was practically no hostility to the treaty. Rather the friends of arbitration and opponents of international war promptly welcomed the agreement chiefly because of the inclusion of Article IV. There was "gratification" in high circles on this ground because of the aims of the allies as asserted in the treaty and because the possibility of a German-Japanese combination was averted. In Russia the press generally welcomed the treaty because of the omission of special reference to the Indian frontier and because, taken in connection with the previous treaty arrangements between Russia and Japan, it would make for better relations between those two powers, and consequently between Russia and England. In other words, the treaty was no longer directly aimed at Russia and had become a guaranty of assurance against general contingencies. These were by no means confined to the Far East and on July 17, the *Peking Daily News* pointed out that German policy as to Morocco had hastened the signature of the fresh treaty. In view of the stimulus of the renewed alliance, China was fearful of even more vigorous extension of Japanese interests in Manchuria and tried again to secure a definition of Manchuria as being clearly included by the term "Chinese Empire." British opinion in China was also alarmed and was by no means favorable to the treaty, for in India, Malaya, and in the Far East generally, Japanese economic competition was beginning to disturb British commercial interests. In Japan the treaty was received with mixed feelings; and all early comment on it was based on the assumption that the pending arbitration treaty between England and the United States would become effective. The leading editorial in the *Japan Times* of July 16 was entitled "All is well with the world." On the other hand, *Hochi Shimbun*, at the other end of the scale of opinion, remarked that Japan was now "America's slave and India's policeman." The leaders of the Popular Party declared that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable, and that the inclusion of Article IV indicated that this was also the opinion of

the British Government, which had taken this means to avoid being drawn into the struggle. The Japanese jingo press went further and in *Tokio Asahi* of July 16, it was proposed that the United States, in order to secure an arbitration treaty with Japan, should actually guarantee Manchuria to Japan. More sober opinion in Japanese financial circles pointed out that the treaty, as renewed, should minimize the danger caused by irresponsible talk of war between the United States and Japan; and Count Hayashi favored closer relations between the two countries.²³

The situation in England was on the whole quite different. The country was much occupied during the summer of 1911 by the festivities in connection with the coronation of George V; the bitter controversy as to the powers of the House of Lords as embodied in the Parliament bill of that year and the possibility of labor troubles figured largely in the public mind. The result was that comparatively little attention was paid to the renewal of the treaty at this time. The *Times*, however, sought to magnify the importance of the agreement, for it declared that:

Its revision and renewal in the present summer have been carried out only after the fullest consultation with the Dominion Ministers, recently in London, who are understood to have given it their unreserved support. It carries, therefore, a new authority and a new moral force, and represents the first fruits of the great departure in regard to foreign policy taken by the British Government at the recent Imperial Conference.²⁴

4. THE DOMINIONS AND JAPAN

This treaty of 1911, like its predecessors, was of course a political and military instrument. But, side by side with it, there were the Anglo-Japanese treaties of commerce and navigation of 1894 and 1911.

²³ *Japan Times*, July 18, 1911, Cf. *Japan Daily Mail*, July 17, for a useful summary of the press.

²⁴ *London Times*, July 14, 1911. On the next day there was fuller comment as follows:

We have reason to congratulate ourselves not only upon the conclusion of the new Treaty, but also upon the conditions in which it has been effected. When the first unofficial report that it had been accomplished reached us from New York we drew attention to its significance in relation to the new Imperial foreign policy happily inaugurated at the Imperial Conference. It is indeed gratifying that within a few brief weeks of its adoption this policy should afford us, and should afford the world, so signal a proof of the fresh strength it has added to our diplomacy. It is gratifying, we may perhaps say, above all to those who, like ourselves, have long insisted without visible response on the wisdom and on the necessity of the new departure taken by Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey. They must know better than most of us, that, had they not taken it, the prolongation of the Japanese treaty would almost certainly

Indeed, we have seen that, in 1899, the abandonment by England of extraterritorial rights in Japan, as provided by the treaty of 1894, was an important preliminary step in the development of the close political association of the two powers in 1902. In any case economics and politics are two sides of the same coin; and when fundamental questions of race equality and immigration come to the surface the political effect of such matters may well be extensive, if not decisive. Japan had early adopted a policy of restriction as to aliens. The ownership of agricultural land by foreigners was prevented, and the immigration of foreign labor on any large scale was prohibited. Australia had repeatedly voiced an almost national fervor in opposition to Asiatic immigration; and this slogan of a "White Australia" had found legal expression in one of the first general acts of the Commonwealth legislature in 1901. In South Africa, where there was already an almost overwhelming native African population, the issue of Oriental labor, chiefly Indian, Malayan, and Chinese, was a very touchstone of domestic and Imperial politics. New Zealand was not far behind in such controversies; and shortly after the signature of the political and commercial treaties of 1911, the problem of Japanese immigration to the Dominion of Canada flared out in angry fashion in British Columbia. Local feeling along the Pacific shores of the United States had given example of sincere and bitter opposition to Japanese immigration and British Columbia held similar views. Add to this, that throughout the Dominion a vigorous and calculated system of close direction and supervision of all immigration was already a settled Canadian policy. Inevitably such matters had their place in the field of political alliance. They gained in importance as success gave new life to ancient Japanese national pride. Inter-

have given rise to discontent and to misgivings in the Dominions which need not now be apprehended. By admitting the Prime Ministers of the Dominions to complete confidence and by submitting to them the general foreign policy of the Empire, the government will have overcome many prejudices, smoothed many susceptibilities, and conjured many phantoms. It is notorious, to name but one of these phantoms, that large sections of opinion in the Dominions have looked askance at the Japanese Alliance, because they were haunted by the fear that one day it might entangle us in a contest with the United States. The renewed Alliance is the best answer to such fears. It has been approved, we have no doubt, by the most trusted statesmen of the Dominions

We welcome it in itself; we welcome it as a condition of the Arbitration Treaty; we welcome it because it is the common work of the responsible statesmen of the Empire; we welcome it, not least, because it is a gage of continuity for the future as it is an example of continuity in the past—because it discloses, to all eyes that can see, an additional element of permanence in our foreign affairs.

national prestige and consciousness of military and naval strength quickened an innate contempt for the mysterious yet despised white race which affected vast numbers of Asiatics. Such matters were inflammable. The fact that they have not as yet prevented the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is evidence of two things. On the one hand, stands out the importance of the alliance from a political point of view, and secondly, we can watch the way the Japanese Government uses and controls the immigration question as a political instrument whether as an apparent test of friendly relations, as a sort of "smoke screen" to hide other policies, as a basis for diplomatic trading, or as a matter of no special importance between hearty allies.

Another aspect of the Anglo-Japanese treaties of commerce and navigation of 1894 and of 1911 appears in the special provision for the local interests and sentiments of the other portions of the British Empire. Thus, the treaty of 1894 did not apply to Canada, Newfoundland, South African and Australian colonies, New Zealand, or India unless within two years any of these should be specifically included. In the commercial treaty of 1911 the rest of the empire was also excluded unless notice of adhesion were given within two years.²⁵ Canada, in spite of warning from the London government, finally accepted, in 1906, the terms of the earlier treaty. Almost immediately there was trouble in British Columbia where there was local anti-Japanese legislation. Rioting followed and the whole issue of Canadian immigration statutes and the Japanese treaty came to the front; but in 1908 agreement was reached by which the Japanese government agreed to restrict immigration to Canada. In 1911, Canada hesitated to accept the new treaty of commerce yet finally, in 1913, acceded on condition that nothing in the treaty should affect the immigration act of Canada and that Japan should continue the limitation and control of emigrant labor as agreed in 1908.²⁶ Australia and New Zealand remained outside the treaty; but special "most-favored-nation" conventions were signed for trade between Japan and India. Thus the influence of the political alliance has not avoided

²⁵ Hertslet, *British Commercial Treaties*, XIX, 698, Art. XIX (1894); and XXVI, 743, Art. XXVI (1811).

²⁶ *Idem*, XXVII, 909; Keith, *Responsible Government in the Dominions* (3 vols., London, 1912), II, 1079; Keith, *Imperial Unity and the Dominions* (Oxford, 1916), p. 193.

difficulties in the Dominions; Japan has not broken through the barriers of "White Australia"; and in the Straits Settlements there has been sharp local feeling shown against the extension of Japanese economic interests. Indeed, the anti-Japanese feeling in both India and Malaya has been increasing among the resident British. Underlying the whole question of the present treaty and its renewal there are, therefore, the delicate matters of labor and of commercial relations. As far as the British Empire may be concerned it is decidedly to the interest of Japan to avoid controversy and to let sleeping dogs lie, particularly as long as the alliance is profitable to Japan's interests along other lines. Meanwhile race equality remains a difficult question even within the British Empire and barely quiescent in its foreign relations.

5. THE ALLIES AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTIONS, 1911-13

During 1911-13 Japanese interests in China were naturally affected by events nearer home. For a Chinese revolution started in October, 1911, which led to the abolition of the old Empire and establishment of the Republic. Partly as an outgrowth of this movement two rival republican forces also developed. So that in 1913 civil war began between north and South China, and at Nanking a stubborn contest was waged by the opposing forces. Under the terms of the treaty of alliance the two allies were bound to act together against a hostile foreign power in the Far East. They were also concerned in the maintenance of general peace and were to consult with each other in case the interests of either power were menaced. Obviously the question of intervention in China was of great importance to Japan. At first the Japanese Foreign Office, while maintaining official neutrality, sent unofficial delegates to consult with the republican rebels in the south. The idea was to discover grounds of intervention or, at least, to have lines out in both directions to profit by the course of events. Opinion in Japan was alarmed at the prospect of a genuine anti-imperial movement in China which might affect Japanese politics; hence the pressure on the part of the military element to come to the aid of the Manchu dynasty and thus to secure a stronger foothold in the north. This movement the British opposed, believing that the republican rising was too strong a national movement to make it advisable to take an open stand against it. In turn, the Japanese also

proposed close relations with the rebels; but they met on the whole with small encouragement, for they wished large concessions as guaranties from the republicans. In fact the question of concessions came up in the Diet, and in February, 1912, the government said it had given all possible help to Japanese who were seeking concessions in China, but that the representatives of other foreign powers had objected to such violations of neutrality and the government had been compelled to stop this policy.²⁷

This, of course, was a hit at the failure of the British on this occasion to back up the Japanese. Indeed, there was a sharp outbreak of anti-British feeling in the Japanese press early in 1912.

The Chinese Republic became a fact by the abdication of the ancient dynasty and, for a time, both northern and southern republicans were united under a provisional government. In view of these circumstances, after the disappointment of 1911, Japan turned once more to Russia, and, as we have seen, added to the third secret treaty with Russia in 1912. In other words, the policy of spheres of influence for Russia, in northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, and for Japan, in southern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, was restated in 1912 in much the same fashion that it had been stated in common discussion at the beginning of the century, when there was so much talk of the "break-up" of China. But in 1912 the British were bound by the Anglo-Russian entente; the first Balkan war had begun; and Europe was nervous over the interests of the 'great powers,' in the Near East. Consequently, the events of that year worked to give fresh opportunities for Japanese expansion at the very time of the establishment of the Chinese Republic and without consideration of the principles embodied in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Shortly after this a third stage was reached when Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the southern Chinese republicans, broke with the new republican authorities at Peking and fled to Tokyo. There he wished to thank, as he said, Japanese who had aided him in 1911, and to gain fresh assistance for a second revolutionary movement in China. The Japanese Government remained officially neutral; but help was forthcoming by promises of concessions and by the organization of a Chinese-Japanese corporation, of which Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Baron Shibusawa (the Japanese financial magnate) were made joint presidents, and Mr. Kurachi (till recently the Japanese Vice-Minister of

²⁷ Pooley, *Japan's Foreign Policy* (London, 1920), p. 68.

Foreign Affairs) became vice-president. Under such circumstances the second rebellion in China broke out in 1913. The Peking view of the matter was given by the Vice-President of the Chinese Republic who said with reference to disorder in China alleged to be fostered from abroad:

Japan does not want China to grow strong. That is her broad political object, and she adopts various means of keeping China back and retarding her development. One way to keep China weak is to split the country into two or several parts, each arrayed against the others. A way to retard and prevent our development is to put obstacles in the way of introduction of modern industrialism.²⁸

The revolt failed at Nanking and the southern Chinese leaders again fled to Japan. Whatever may have been the direct part of the Japanese in this attempt, the net results do not indicate any vigorous desire by the government at Tokyo to secure the "general peace" to which they were pledged by their British alliance. Japanese policy was now to eschew revolutions for a time and to follow other methods at Peking. Yet there was no question that, with another opportunity given either by disorders in China or by external events, Japan would return to more active methods of increasing her power and position in China; this in spite of the fact that all three of her treaties with Great Britain had spoken of the "independence and integrity" of China. In the meantime there were the urgent needs of the new and struggling Chinese Republic for financial assistance. In the negotiations of the powers to provide funds and to secure satisfactory pledges for their repayment the Japanese took a lively part, and actually borrowed money to lend it in turn to China. These steps and other economic measures do not concern us in detail at present. For larger though remote events in 1913 were preparing the way in Europe for the catastrophe of 1914.

6. JAPAN'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR, 1914

The Balkan wars of 1912-13 and the general international situation had naturally distracted public attention to a considerable degree from the state of affairs in the Far East; but with the outbreak of the World War came a more direct test of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It is a question whether the exact terms of the treaty required the

²⁸ Pooley, p. 91. Quoted from an interview given to Mr. T. F. Millard on July 16, 1913.

entry of Japan into the war as the ally of England. Viscount Ishii, in the United States in 1918, said that Japan did not come into the war because of any diplomatic engagements. On the other hand, we have the decision of the Japanese Government, as given in the ultimatum to Germany on August 15, 1914, which refers to the interests "as contemplated in the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain." The British official announcement on August 18 naturally used the same words. Back of this, however, during the first fortnight of August, both in England and Japan, there was apparently a division of opinion on the matter. Certainly the Japanese military statesmen were not loath to declare war; but they wished the British to ask for their aid; and this the British Government was at first by no means anxious to do. It is quite probable that the necessities of the British Admiralty in the Far East carried the day and promoted the Japanese declaration of war. If that is so the British Foreign Office took a quick step to announce with Japan the limitation of the field of Japanese operations and the purposes of Japan in the war. Even before the time set for the expiration of the Japanese ultimatum to Germany, notice was given that, though it would be necessary for the British and Japanese to act in the protection of their general interests in the Far East, as provided by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the independence and integrity of China were, nevertheless, one of the objects of that alliance. Japan did not then propose to act in the Pacific beyond the China Seas, except for the protection of Japanese shipping in the Pacific, nor were Japanese troops to be employed except against "territory in German occupation" on the mainland of eastern Asia. Following the declaration of war on August 23, the Japanese press began immediately to proclaim the fact that, since Germany had refused to accept the Japanese ultimatum Japan was no longer bound to the terms of that ultimatum, which had included a demand that Germany surrender, "without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochau with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China."²⁹

By October 1, from a variety of sources it was evident that the Japanese were claiming reversionary rights as to German railway concessions in the entire province of Shantung, and Japanese naval vessels were acting well beyond the area of the China Seas in their

²⁹ MacMurray, II, 1167.

seizure of the Marshall Islands and other German outposts in the Pacific. Assurance was given by Japan, however, that the occupation of the Marshall Islands was merely temporary and for military purposes only. The campaign in the Japanese press against restoration of any German interests to China became more vehement after the success of the Japanese expedition which secured the surrender of Tsingtao on November 7. Undoubtedly this success was a sharp blow to German colonial interests and it excited in Berlin the greatest bitterness against Japan. There was corresponding joy in Tokyo, for the Japanese had never forgotten the fashion in which, in 1895, Germany had joined with Russia and France to rob them of part of the fruits of their successful war against China. Possibly the threat of the Japanese fleet in the Pacific had had effect in driving German cruisers to take refuge at Guam and in the Philippines; but the main ships of the German fleet had left Tsingtao before the Japanese ultimatum. They went southward to defeat Admiral Craddock off the coast of Chile, and then to their own destruction in the battle off the Falkland Islands. The Japanese in their cruises eastward were therefore not able to establish contact with German naval forces in the Pacific. To the westward the Japanese patrol along the Asiatic coast extended at first as far as Singapore, where Japanese marines were useful in aiding the suppression of a mutiny by a British Indian regiment in 1915. With the fall of Tsingtao, Japanese naval forces went to Australian waters and acted as convoy for troop ships as far as the Red Sea. Later, especially in 1917, the wide southern maritime area between Australia and South Africa was in their general charge. The same year also saw the despatch of anti-submarine forces to the Mediterranean.

But no Japanese troops were sent either to the Near East or to Europe. Indeed, from a very early date Baron Kato opposed the sending of Japanese troops to the main fields of combat. Later, when the French were urgent in their desire for reenforcements, the lack of shipping for this purpose prevented such coöperation. In the supply of munitions and the development of a mercantile marine the participation of Japan was useful and, as we will see later, troops were sent to Siberia in 1918. In the meantime, the military occupation of Tsingtao was completed and troops were finally sent to guard railway lines in northern Manchuria. In a military sense, therefore, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a useful factor in the war.

In the field of diplomacy the cooperation of Japan in the war was first marked by the adhesion of Japan, on October 19, 1914, to the London Agreement of September 5, between Great Britain, France and Russia, to which Italy later also adhered.³⁰ This London Agreement provided that peace was to be made in common by the Allies. There was considerable opposition in Japan to this adhesion. It was pointed out that the Anglo-Japanese treaty, by Article II, already provided directly for the making of peace in common by England and Japan. Furthermore, the claim was made that the Japanese Cabinet had disregarded constitutional rights of the Privy Council in binding Japan by this new treaty.

All of this discussion, however, was in part due to the beginning, in 1916, of violent anti-British propaganda in Japan. Thus, the Japanese vernacular press refused to copy dispatches from the pro-British *Japan Times* and the opinion was general, particularly in the army, that the Central Powers were likely to win. This whole campaign became more vehement as British and American opposition to Japanese claims in China developed. As early as December, 1914, Baron Kato had declared in the Diet that it was impossible to say that Kiaochow was to be returned to China, that Japan was in nowise committed on this point, and that the failure of Germany to accept the original ultimatum had nullified the proposal of restitution of Kiaochow to China.³¹

7. ENTRY OF CHINA INTO THE WAR, 1917

The uncertainties of the war and Japanese anxieties as to her eventual share of the spoils at the conclusion of peace were responsible for a further diplomatic move by Japan in February, 1917. This was apparently in general accord with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, providing for peace in common, and was, from a Japanese point of view, on a par with the various secret agreements of the Allies as to future terms of peace. But the Japanese demands came at a very serious moment for the Allied cause. The submarine campaign was reaching its height in European waters; conditions in Russia were becoming very critical; the United States had not as yet entered the war; and the Allied fortunes were desperately threatened.

³⁰ Hertslet, XXVII, 489-491. Japan signed the agreement, including Italy on November 30, 1915.

³¹ Millard, *Democracy and the Eastern Question* (New York, 1919), p. 82.

It was then that the Japanese Government secured from England, France, Italy, and Russia pledges in a secret exchange of notes, during February and March of 1917, that the Allies would support Japanese claims at a future peace conference. The British reply read as follows:

His Britannic Majesty's Government accede with pleasure to request of the Japanese Government for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights, in Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being understood that the Japanese Government will in the eventual peace settlement treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the equator.³²

Three days after this, on February 19, the Japanese Government approached the French and Russian ambassadors stating that, in view of their particular arrangements concerning peace conditions, "such as arrangements relative to the disposition of the Bosphorous, Constantinople, and the Dardenelles," which were under discussion by the powers interested, the Japanese Government wished to demand from Germany the surrender of her territorial and special interests in the Far East, and wished the support of France and of Russia. The French acceded to this note, but demanded that Japan should support the plan to force China to break its diplomatic relations with Germany. Russia and Italy also gave formal adhesion. Thus, before the United States entered the war, Japan had secured by these secret agreements the support of the Allies for claims which were later successfully maintained by the Treaty of Versailles. It is particularly the Shantung agreement which has attracted most criticism in America, yet of all the Japanese diplomatic moves of this time it received the most direct support by England, in spite of its threat to China's integrity.

Another phase of this matter also appears in the entry of China into the war. In March, 1917, diplomatic relations with Germany were broken by China and the formal declaration of war followed on August 14.³³ But why did not China enter the war earlier? In fact, she made several attempts to do so and on each occasion was rebuffed. This appears first in the proposal by the Chinese to take

³² MacMurray, II, 1168.

³³ MacMurray, II 1361 *et seq.*, where the related documents are also printed.

Tsingtao from the Germans in 1914. At this time British advice was effective and China was checked; Japan was already bound on her expedition to seize the German concession and the British were concerned that there should be no friction between their ally and China at this time. A year later a second discussion of the matter took place at Peking. By this time the Japanese were firmly entrenched at Kiaochow and did not wish to have the matter of the ultimate disposal of the German settlement raised. They feared the entry of China would block their plans as to Shantung. Indeed, Article I of the "Twenty-one Demands" on China, which Japan had first made in January, 1915, was embodied in the treaty of May 25, 1915, between the two governments. Article I of that treaty read:

Article I. The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.³⁴

The Japanese, therefore, apparently brought pressure to bear at Peking to hold China back from participation in the war at that time. This part of the Twenty-one Demands was consequently also an important preliminary step to the secret agreement between England and Japan in 1917, and to the support given to Japan by her ally in April, 1919. It cleared the way for the disposal of the former German interests in the territory of Kiaochow to Japan, as provided for in Section VIII of the Treaty of Versailles.

Emboldened by this success in 1915, and in spite of vigorous foreign criticism of Japanese policies in China, the Japanese Government successfully met still a third attempt to bring China into the war. This time, in 1916, the British, French, and Russian ambassadors at Tokyo took up the matter. But the Japanese Government was loath to move and pointed its objections by speaking of great dangers to civilization if the millions of China were to be armed and drilled into an effective fighting machine. So ended 1916, with England and Japan pursuing opposite methods as to China's participation in the war. Then early in 1917, came the rupture of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany; we invited China and other neutral states to follow our example; and on February 9, China gave a conditional promise to do so. Immediately

³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 1216

after this Japan pressed on the Allies the signature of the secret agreements as to Shantung and the German islands in the Pacific. The British note on this matter, which has already been quoted, was dated February 16; there was now no further hitch; and the French note to Japan was particularly clear in requiring Japan's support at Peking. For as a condition of French diplomatic assistance for Japanese claims in the future, the government at Tokyo was now to unite with the Allies in their invitation to China to enter the war. The Chinese understood the bearing of the whole matter and in the final presidential declaration of war against Germany is the significant language of the last paragraph:

I cannot bear to think that through us the dignity of International Law should be impaired, or the position in the family of nations should be undermined or the restoration of the world peace and happiness should be retarded. It is, therefore, hoped that all of our people will exert their utmost in these hours of hardship, with a view to maintaining and strengthening the existence of the Chinese Republic, so that we may establish ourselves amidst the family of nations and share with them the happiness and benefits derived therefrom.³⁵

The Allied Powers and the United States, now all at war with the Central Powers, greeted this statement with an identical note at Peking, each legation replying:

In reply I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my government is pleased to take this opportunity to give to the Chinese Government the assurance of its solidarity, of its friendship and of its support. It will do all that depends upon it in order that China may have the benefit in her international relations of the situation and the regards due to a great country.³⁶

This language was of course quite contrary to the objects of the secret agreement of February, 1917, between Japan and the Allies; but Tokyo had made its bargain which in turn was opposed to the professed spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Thus the very entry of China into the war was marked, on the part of new associates, by the attempt to prevent her from recovering the concessions in Shantung which, in 1898, she had been forced to yield to Germany, and which were now in Japanese hands.

³⁵ MacMurray, II, 1362.

³⁶ MacMurray, II, 1363.

8. JAPANESE AGREEMENTS WITH RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

In the meantime, Japan had sought to consolidate her position in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia by pursuing a line of policy already indicated in the successive open and secret agreements with Russia which date from 1907. For, in 1916, there was signed on July 3 a secret treaty, practically of alliance, between Russia and Japan which was "revealed from the files of the Russian Foreign Office at Petrograd by the Trotsky-Lenine government in 1918." Both internal and external evidence are sufficient to make the document fairly trustworthy. By this treaty Japan and Russia engaged to safeguard China from the political domination of any third hostile power and agreed to cooperate to this end. In the event of a declaration of war by such a third hostile power the two allies were to act together both in war and in the conclusion of peace. Article IV, however, is particularly important in that apparently it implied the necessity of cooperation and assistance to Russia and Japan by their other allies. Thus:

It is requisite to have in view that neither one or the other of the high contracting parties must consider itself bound by Article II of this agreement (as to war and peace) to lend armed aid to its ally, unless it be given guarantees by its allies that the latter will give it assistance corresponding in character to the importance of the approaching conflict.³⁷

This treaty was to run for five years with provision for continuation beyond that date. Article VI declared that this agreement "must remain profoundly secret except to both of the High Contracting Parties." Of the same date, also, was the open convention between Russia and Japan providing for general cooperation of the two powers in the Far East.³⁸ Neither power was to be a party to any arrangement or political combination directed against the other. It is somewhat difficult to determine the exact purposes of this secret alliance; and the interpretation of Article IV with its rather involved language may be made clearer by a revelation of another text of this treaty. Nevertheless, in its practical effect, apparently Japan was unwilling to depend on the assistance which Russia might give unless the other ally, France, should also give assistance in proportion to the interests involved, and Russia was unwilling to embark on a new war unless England or other allies joined in.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1328. ³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1327.

Naturally the question also arises, what third hostile power Japan may have had in mind. Was it Germany? Or was it the United States, which in 1916 was still a neutral? Were the words merely general in meaning used to link together Russian and Japanese policies of expansion in the Far East? On these points we may have to await further disclosures. It is plain, however, that throughout the war, the Japanese were engaged in a diplomatic campaign to secure all that they could for themselves in the Far East. This was either by means of their alliance with England or in spite of it and, often, without reference to its spirit and purpose as defined in the language of the treaty. The successive agreements with Russia which were crowned by the treaties of 1916 were themselves an outgrowth of this connection with England and were in part appendices to the growth of the Anglo-Russian entente. The Twenty-one Demands on China including those which were not finally accepted show an almost cynical disregard of the Anglo-Japanese treaty. Yet in all these moves and counter moves, even with regard to the entry of China into the war, the Japanese Government could depend on at least the tacit acquiescence of her ally. Indeed, she was almost "on the back of England" in 1916-17 and there was no governmental check, in those critical months, on the campaign in the Japanese press attacking the usefulness of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. These attacks fell under five main headings: (1) discrimination against Japanese in British colonies, (2) the obstruction of Japanese economic expansion in the South Sea Islands; (3) the efforts to exclude Japanese interests from south China; (4) the British share in the defeat of the fifth group of Japanese demands on China in 1915; and (5) the declaration that Russia and Germany need no longer be feared, while in any case the United States threatened to nullify the usefulness of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Taken together these assertions are a table of contents of Japanese policies.

The war, therefore, was, from the Japanese point of view, a natural opportunity. The very necessities of the European allies gave to Japan special and unexpected chances; the situation in China and the relationship of China to the war were complicating factors; and Japan felt free to ignore the principles of the alliance with England while at the same time she made use of it and outwardly adhered to it. She supplemented her agreements with England and with the

allied powers to make peace in common with them by forcing the secret agreement of 1917. And, later in that year, Japan celebrated her position in the flourish of the Lansing-Ishii agreement. In this statement the United States recognized "that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous."³⁹ This document employed the usual language as to the maintenance of the Open Door and the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of China; it also adopted the very phraseology of the Japanese note on November 22, 1905, when Japan spoke of the "relations of propinquity" which compelled her to take direction of the political and military affairs of Korea.⁴⁰ The results of that "propinquity" are now a matter of history. It was in such fashion that Japan underscored her position and exposed her aims.

9. JAPAN IN SIBERIA

Elsewhere in the Far East there was still another field of action, both diplomatic and military. Siberia was not specifically included in the words of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but was certainly Far Eastern and lay on the borders of China including Mongolia and Manchuria. The results of the Russian revolutions of 1917 and the internal condition of Siberia gave serious anxiety to the Allies in 1918. There was a strong element in Japan that wished to intervene in Siberia, and, after long delays, the way was cleared for the extension of Japanese military action in the war by the despatch of armed forces of the allied and associated powers to Vladivostok. The whole policy of these powers with reference to Russia, and more particularly in regard to Siberia, is much entangled and controversial; at this time we can deal only with the established facts in the case and point out the sequence of events. Certainly it seems unlikely that we would have seen by October, 1918, something over 72,000 Japanese troops despatched to Siberia, or to the frontier of Siberia, if it had not been for the fact of the original existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Following the Russian revolutions the Allies pursued a variety of policies as to Russia, no one of which was destined to

³⁹ MacMurray, II, 1394.

⁴⁰ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1905, p. 613.

be wholly successful. The desirability of some joint action in Siberia turned first chiefly on the problem of the Czechoslovak forces which were then endeavoring to make headway against armed German and Austrian prisoners in Russia. Consequently, the United States announced on August 5, 1918, that in order to protect and help the Czechoslovak forces, "to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance from Vladivostok," and to guard military stores which may be needed, the United States would cooperate with France and England. Japan acceded to this proposal and consequently there was organized a cooperative American-Japanese expedition to Siberia to which were joined smaller army units of the other allies.

The original plan was that only a few thousand troops were to be sent by the United States and Japan. The United States also made it very clear that there were to be "no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia and no intervention in her internal affairs, not even in the local affairs of the limited area which her (American) military force may be obliged to occupy and no impairment of her (Russian) territorial integrity either now or hereafter. . . ." This declaration met with Japanese diplomatic support, but very early in the course of these operations it became evident that it might be necessary for the combined forces to press farther into the interior of Siberia than had been at first contemplated. The United States troops were in the main confined to the neighborhood of Vladivostok, but the Japanese went well beyond that point. The collapse of Russian opposition to Bolshevik forces became so clear in 1919 that, early in 1920, the last American forces were withdrawn from Siberia. It was felt, with the repatriation of the Czechoslovak forces and in view of the political instability and grave uncertainties of the situation in eastern Siberia, that the main purposes for which American troops had been sent to Siberia no longer existed, and that it was necessary, with regret on the part of the United States, to withdraw from a coöperative effort by the United States and Japan to assist the Russian people.

Nevertheless, Japanese troops remain in Siberia to this date, in order, it is said, to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects and to prevent bolshevism from spreading to Japan. Whether these are the exact and complete reasons for the continued Japanese occupation is doubtful; for there are comparatively few Japanese to be

found in eastern Siberia and the Japanese certainly have not failed to occupy themselves with the internal disorders and feuds between rival Russian forces operating with devastating effect in Siberia. It is not entirely clear what purpose these Japanese policies may serve, but actually one of the rival Russian governments in eastern Siberia was undoubtedly supported by Japan. If maintained at Vladivostok this government would be chiefly dependent on Japan at least for the immediate future. The expense of this Japanese occupation is considerable, and it may be that the Japanese supporters of the venture are hoping to see some more tangible results from their aggressive military policy and economic penetration. A recent press dispatch, however, reports that Japan intends to withdraw her troops. It is therefore impossible to say how far England is committed to Japanese policies as to Siberia; but, certainly as far as can be discovered, there has not been any protest with regard to Japanese plans in that region. In the main, therefore, this has given rise to the belief that Japan, with the approval of her ally, has received practically a free hand in northeastern Asia on the borders of China. The indirect and prospective results of this cooperative expedition of 1918 into Siberia seem to fit in with a plan of Japanese political and economic operations at variance with the policies which the United States has maintained. The whole entangled matter also serves to emphasize the extent and variety of questions which may arise within the scope of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance or which may be affected by it. The first treaty was largely directed against Russia in 1902. The present treaty seems to imply British approval of the extension of Japanese interests in eastern Siberia in 1921. Will a third renewal of the alliance ratify such an arrangement and give ground for further changes? In any case we have to review the course of events up to the present and to the issues and interests involved.

CHAPTER IV

THE ALLIANCE TODAY, 1919-1921

1. AMERICAN OPINION AND THE ALLIANCE

Yuan Shih-kai, the late President of China, said in September, 1914: "Japan is going to take advantage of this war to get control in China."¹ Today Japan is not in control of China, though the various Chinese governments, both general and provincial, have not done much to prevent it, nor for that matter have other foreign powers. A long step has been taken in the direction of translating legitimate commercial enterprise on the part of Japanese economic interests into a dominating Japanese political, administrative, and military influence in Chinese affairs. This process has gone on without much consideration on the part of Japan of the terms of the English alliance and with still less anxiety as to the legitimate interests of the citizens of other foreign states including China. At the same time, the military and naval preparations of Japan have been hastened and enlarged. Other nations, including the United States, have become alarmed at the possible consequences of further competition in armaments; they dread the possibility of another costly war, and realize the world-wide demand for peace. A discussion of limitation of armament might have started from any basis which was of sufficient political importance and which was also dangerous in a military or naval sense. The fact that at Washington negotiation as to Pacific and Far Eastern questions is "in connection with" discussion of plans for reduction in armament gives such a conference wider influence and may assist settlements and understandings which are essential to an agreement; for, fundamentally, this conference will not succeed unless it aims first and foremost at peace. The regulation and limitation of armament may cause comparatively little trouble if the causes of misunderstandings and the spirit of hostility are once removed or subdued.

¹ Reinsch, *Secret Diplomacy and the Twenty-one Demands in Asia* (November, 1921), p. 937.

In this process public opinion has a vital part; and, in the case of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, American opinion has apparently concluded that, in some way or other, the Anglo-Japanese treaty is partly responsible for difficulties in the Far East and for this reason is a menace to American interests. Lord Bryce, after a recent visit to America, recognizes this fact and is quoted as writing on his return to England:

It has been pointed out over and over again that there is nothing in that treaty to affect the United States. Nevertheless, nine men out of ten in the United States continue to repeat that England is the ally—the exclusive ally—of Japan, and that the effect of the treaty has been and is to make Japan think she has a comparatively free hand and may adopt policies of aggression on which she would otherwise fear to embark. No explanations seem likely to remove this impression from the American mind.²

A variety of things have led to this state of mind, for at the outset of discussion along these lines, American opinion was not generally aware of the facts nor was it alive to any special connection between “disarmament” and the Far Eastern question of which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is only an element, though an important element. Any attempt to show that this feeling against the alliance is mistaken is another matter, to which objection must be taken later; at present we have to deal only with the genesis and fact of that hostile opinion. It is a comparatively fresh view in any case; it is negative rather than positive; and, except for blatant anti-British propaganda, such as we have learned to expect from certain papers, it has not been the result of any long campaign of education. In short, this suspicion as to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has had little cultivation but it has spread very quickly. Under the circumstances the temptation is to assume a fertile soil or to cling to the idea that it is due to mere ignorance. Both may be partially correct, but in a sense different from that employed by the defenders of the treaty.

Undoubtedly any person with pro-German or pro-Sinn Fein and therefore with anti-British views might be unreasoningly opposed to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance *per se*. Yet he would be much more concerned in agitation regarding its renewal, and perhaps favor its renewal, if thereby friendly Anglo-American relations might be endangered. So far no defense of the treaty has come from these ranks

² *New York Times*, October 19, 1921 (quoting *London Times*).

and no special propaganda on the subject. Rather from the friends of England in America, from people who, perhaps mistakenly, look to an Anglo-American alliance, has come the clearest expression of regret at the possibility of the continuance of the Japanese alliance.

It is a curious comment on supposedly well informed foreign opinion that there should be serious proposal of a triple political and military alliance of England, Japan, and the United States, as though the addition of America would give sanctity to results and possibilities of the present combination. Fortunately the United States has at present no desire to enter into any such formal political and military alliance; and there is small question that a renewal of the treaty of 1911, especially if in unmodified language, would be harmful to the continued growth of firm and friendly understanding and association between the United States and Great Britain. The alliance is important enough in Far Eastern affairs; it is also at present an obstinate factor in Anglo-American relations. Some people in the heat of their feeling against Japan declare in short-sighted and fanatical fashion that England must now choose whether she wishes to be friendly to America or to Japan. This of course is not exactly the case nor is it the way to approach the issue. Nevertheless, the feeling exists and a student of the whole matter must see that conditions and views have greatly changed since 1902, and indeed since the close of the World War. The question of the continuance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, with all that that combination means or may mean, has today an influence much beyond the exact terms of any treaty.

The explanation of such facts is a more difficult matter than its appreciation. Even Lord Bryce seems to imply that this view is based on an American misconception of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and that it is unwarranted by the facts in the case, for, in his recent statement as to the critical attitude in America toward the alliance, he continues·

It remains even when Englishmen point out their own interests in securing not only the open door for commerce in China and the political independence of China—both of which things Japan is supposed to threaten—are exactly the same as the interest of America. Again, if it be suggested that Japanese ascendancy in Manchuria and the regions northward as far as the River Amur and Lake Baikal would be injurious to American interests, such advance, if injurious to America, would be no less injurious to British interests. There is really no reason whatever for any divergence between the British and

American policy as regards China and the possible action of Japan there. An attempt by Japan to dominate and exploit China—this is a possible eventuality on which Americans frequently dwell—is, of course, an imaginable danger.

Lord Bryce, in this analysis, is undoubtedly correct, but he omits to state that, while British and American interests and views are in a large way similar, nevertheless, we in America have strong reason to believe that they have been equally opposed by Japanese policies. This very belief makes many Americans wonder more and more why England remains in alliance with a country whose spirit and practice as to Chinese affairs in particular and Far Eastern matters in general seem so contrary to the language of the treaties of alliance and so incompatible with the essence of American traditional policies. Furthermore, what is spoken of as an "imaginable danger" has in American eyes become imminent, for the history of the last few years has not been a closed book, and Japan has been attempting not merely to exploit China but to extend Japanese political power in China; in order to do so she has on occasion adopted methods of threat and duress; and she has frequently disregarded treaty pledges. Such things are repugnant to American policies; they are also excluded by the professed spirit and the alleged purposes of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In other words, American attention has been directed more to the violation or neglect of the principles of the alliance than to its mere existence.

2. GREAT BRITAIN AND WAR WITH UNITED STATES

The United States is not a partner to the alliance. We have nothing to say or do with its provisions or its continuance except in so far as the practice and results as distinguished from the terms of the alliance may involve or possibly affect in unfriendly ways the interests and policies of the United States. Otherwise, unless this contract between England and Japan becomes a danger and a public nuisance to America, we have no legal ground to dispute it or to object to its renewal. There is, however, one other aspect of this matter; it is to be found in Article IV of the present treaty of 1911. This has already been quoted—it provided that the existence of a treaty of general arbitration between either England or Japan and a third state should free either of the two allies from the clearly

belligerent obligations of the alliance in case the other ally was engaged in war with the third power. The intention of this article, in the light of known events, was to bar a war with the United States in which otherwise England might be involved as an ally of Japan. This intent was nullified by the failure of such an arbitration treaty between England and the United States to secure the ratification of the United States. Since 1911, therefore, there has not been any provision in the text of the Anglo-Japanese treaty to prevent the possibility that the United States might be opposed by both England and Japan. On this point there has not been any official public statement to the contrary by the government of either England or Japan except in two instances. On March 1, 1921, in reply to a question in the House of Commons as to the alliance and the position of England in the event of war between the United States and Japan, the Foreign Office, after reviewing the circumstances as to Article IV, said: "Our relations with Japan are so arranged as not to involve us in the possibility of conflict with the United States of America"; with reference to this and naval matters, the answer continued—"no official communication has been made to the United States of America as there is no reason to believe that the responsible authorities are in any doubt as to the true position."³

We find also that on February 4, 1921, before the budget committee of the Japanese House of Representatives, Viscount Uchida said: "Looking at the matter [i.e., Anglo-Japanese Alliance] from a broad point of view we can safely say that at the time of the conclusion of the treaty [i.e., 1911] it was understood that there should be no application to the United States." Of course that is correct for, in 1911, it was supposed that the United States would be automatically excluded by the terms of Article IV of the treaty of alliance. If the United States has received any official notification that anything has taken place between the two allies which would be the equivalent of or be a substitute for Article IV as it was written in 1911, no public statement to that effect has been made; in fact the British Foreign Office said on March 1 that no such official communication had been made.

³ *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, March 1 Cf. *London Times*, March 2, 1921.

Nevertheless, we have other sources and statements which cast additional light on the situation, for on December 5, 1920, the London *Times* said editorially:

It is material to observe that the provision in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Article IV) was made after the fullest consultation with the respective ministers of the British Dominions who were then attending the sitting of the Defence Committee in London. Because of the failure of the Arbitration Treaty recourse was had to the Peace Commission Treaty of Sept. 1914. It is not indeed technically "a treaty of general arbitration" but it is near akin to such a treaty. It obliges England and the United States to refer "all disputes of every nature whatsoever" other than disputes the settlement of which are provided for under existing agreements, to a Permanent International Commission for Investigating and Reporting, though it reserves to the governments the right to independent action after the report has been submitted. But so anxious were the British Government to make their attitude in the contingency of any eventual controversy between the United States and Japan clear, that upon the signature of this peace commission treaty they proceeded immediately to notify Japan that they would regard it as a "general treaty of arbitration" within the meaning of the exemption clause of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

On December 30, 1920, and again on May 3, 1921, Lord Northcliffe said much the same thing. Commenting on Lord Northcliffe's first interview, Baron G. Hayashi, the present Japanese ambassador in London, said:

I welcome the statement as a timely and wise warning to both Japan and United States. . . . It was, therefore, never in the mind of the Japanese Government to fight the United States at all, and moreover in the most improbable eventuality of such war, to which I refer merely for the sake of argument, Japan would not expect England to come to her help. Hence, the Japanese and British Governments agreed to insert in the Agreement of Alliance Article IV, which would absolve Great Britain from an obligation to join Japan in a war against America. Only a general phraseology was selected in the Alliance Agreement for the reasons of diplomatic nicety, but what the negotiators of the agreement had in mind, is obvious. . . . In these circumstances I can assure you with all the emphasis at my command that the Alliance will never stand in the way of the good understanding and friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States of America. Nor is it in the least the intention of Japan to use the Alliance as a means to direct pressure in any degree upon an old friend, the United States of America.⁴

⁴London *Times*, January 4, 1921.

Then Lord Grey of Falloden (who as Sir Edward Grey was British Foreign Secretary both in 1911 and 1914) is reported as saying in a public speech on February 22, 1921:

They did not dispose of the question of war between the United States and this country by calling it unthinkable and inconceivable. It was unthinkable and inconceivable, but that did not make it certain that it might not happen. Infinity and eternity were unthinkable and inconceivable, but most people believed that they happened. He would much rather have people, especially in the United States, where they had been discussing this question as unthinkable and inconceivable, bringing out the plain fact that we had a Peace Treaty with the United States which, if it were observed, would make war impossible. We had a Peace Treaty under which if the two governments could not agree they resorted to a commission which would investigate and report and recommend a settlement and which, if the Treaty was observed, would give at least one year's time for reflection before a breach of the peace took place on that particular quarrel. He did not believe two great democracies would ever go to war if they observed that Treaty. He regretted that in the United States they seemed to be very conscious of the effect of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and to be discussing the possibilities of its involving their own country and ours in war, but they did not seem to be so much aware of the existence of the Treaty made with the United States Government and ratified by the Senate. If treaties were to be observed it was a good thing to keep them continually in mind, so that public opinion assumed they were going to be put into operation. Care had been taken that there should be no conflict between the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and our Treaty with the United States. It had been so obvious the two might conflict that when the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was discussed the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (i.e., Sir Edward Grey) had approached the Japanese Government on the subject and had been met in a spirit of fairness and of true statesmanship by the Japanese Government, and especially by the Japanese Ambassador then in London. They had agreed readily to a clause being put into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which would make it clear that, in the event of a quarrel between Japan and any other country with which we had a Treaty of Arbitration, there was no obligation on us to do other than carry out that Treaty. We had an understanding with Japan that that clause in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance applied to the particular Treaty afterwards made with the United States.⁵

The explanation of these unofficial statements by Lord Northcliffe and by Lord Grey is, therefore, that on the conclusion of the so-called Bryan Peace Commission Treaty between the United States and Great Britain on September 15, 1914, Great Britain took occasion privately

⁵ London *Times*, February 23, 1921.

to propose to Japan or to notify Japan that, for the purposes of the alliance, Great Britain would regard the Anglo-American treaty of September, 1914, as a substitute for an arbitration treaty as mentioned in Article IV of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. From a purely legal point of view the Bryan treaty was of course by no means the same as a treaty of general arbitration as contemplated in 1911. But for political reasons and under the circumstances a British note, which has never been published, was apparently drawn up to the above effect. If these unauthorized statements are correct, Great Britain took steps in 1914 to restore the United States to the exclusive position intended by both allies in 1911 by the language of Article IV. Furthermore, aside from these somewhat devious diplomatic steps, which are not officially known to the United States, the fact remains that the overwhelming sentiment of the British Empire would have been and still is opposed to the possibility of war between Great Britain and the United States. It has seemed wise to enter into this entire matter of Article IV only because there has been so much discussion and false inference regarding it. At all events, whatever future research may show, it is plain that the purpose and intent of the present Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not and does not include the possibility of a war in which the United States would face the British Empire as well as Japan.

3. THE ALLIANCE AND OPINION IN CHINA

China was never consulted in the negotiation of any of the three treaties of alliance. Today the representatives of the government at Peking come to Washington with full international status, but they leave behind them a welter of confusion. The southern leaders who were beaten in 1913 returned to start another civil war at the end of 1916 which still smolders; there are, therefore, two governments in China—one at Canton, under Sun Yat-Sen, and one at Peking with which foreign governments continue to negotiate. Both Canton and Peking, however, are to a considerable extent at the mercy of provincial governors and restless military chieftains. The result is that the great mass of the Chinese people have no coherent national organization which could defend them against foreign aggression, secure domestic reform, or adequately voice national desires. This chaotic condition is of itself sufficient to invite foreign intervention and to provoke

discussion of varied remedies. Under the circumstances Chinese opinion as to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is at best fragmentary and often misleading. Yet underlying nearly all views on the subject is the dread lest, relying on the vague virtues of the alliance, Japan may secure even greater influence in China than she now possesses.

Following the Treaty of Versailles there was a temporary boycott of Japanese goods in China, there has also been considerable talk of a proposed boycott against British goods in case the treaty of 1911 is renewed. Whether this is more than a rumor or no, there is little doubt that the British in China are now looked upon with deep suspicion in many quarters because of their ally's policies. Almost ludicrous evidence of a pathetic but earnest attempt to maintain national self-respect and to express opposition to the renewal of the alliance is seen in a belated Chinese protest against the mere mention of China in any new treaty between Great Britain and Japan. This protest the British Government refused to publish.⁶ But the feelings which lie back of that protest find voice in the Far East. Thus the *Peking and Tientsin Times* of July 13, 1921, excoriates Japan's mere "lip-service to most of the Far Eastern policies of Great Britain and the United States" and points out that "there is wide divergence between her (Japan's) professions and her practice." Likewise the *North China Daily News* of frequent dates in last June wages war against the renewal of the alliance and finally, on June 18, advocates the calling of an international conference on Pacific questions with the hope of consequent delay in the signature of a new agreement between England and Japan.

The position of British residents in China and the Far East has been especially difficult during the past few years. Often attempts have been made to show them as favoring the combination with Japan. This, however, is contrary to the bulk of the evidence and when of late there has been a less critical view of the alliance taken in the local British press, it has been of such a uniform type as to suggest that a hint had been given from high quarters to step more carefully in such delicate matters. The root of British dissatisfaction with the alliance has lain in the increasing competition of Japanese commerce in China; this has alarmed British mercantile and financial interests to a considerable degree. They also object to the notion

⁶ London *Times*, June 11, 1920.

that they may suffer in their business relations with the Chinese because of their apparent approval of Japanese methods. This idea comes at a particularly inconvenient time when British post-war trade plans include the development of an important British-Chinese holding corporation which would provide for coöperation with Chinese commercial interests for business to be done outside of the treaty ports. Such general feeling of opposition to the alliance appeared, however, as early as 1918 in the protests of various British chambers of commerce in China. By the beginning of 1921 it had taken such definite form that an analysis of the Far Eastern press shows the main British reasons for opposing the alliance to be: (1) it no longer has any object; (2) Japanese policies in China are opposed to the alliance and to British interests in China; (3) British and Japanese interests in China are incompatible; (4) Chinese resentment is increasing against Japan and hence indirectly against the British; and (5) opposition exists in Australasia and in Canada to certain features of the alliance. During 1921 such feelings have, perhaps, somewhat abated but important articles by prominent Englishmen connected with Far Eastern affairs still continue to appear. Thus Robert Young, editor of *The Japan Chronicle* concludes: "The agreement is wholly against the real interests of the British and Japanese peoples, which consist in the establishment of good relations and friendship with all nations."⁷

4. JAPAN AND THE ALLIANCE

Japanese opinion regarding the alliance has varied a great deal during the past ten years. Prior to the renewal of the treaty in 1911 the verdict in favor of the British connection was almost unanimous. Since that date, on the occasion of the first Chinese revolution, in connection with the secret treaties with Russia, and more recently at the height of the war in 1916, there have been bitter anti-British outbreaks in the Japanese press. There is therefore under the surface plenty of combustible material; but it awaits an official order to flame out against the alliance. Of course, the great majority of the Japanese people are comparatively indifferent to the provisions of the treaty. They are so accustomed to the leadership of the small group of men who are in control of the major national policies of Japan

⁷ Young, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance" in *Contemporary Review* (July, 1921), p. 19. Cf. also Macartney, "China and the Washington Conference," *idem.* (September, 1921), p. 308.

that the decision as to the treaty, whatever its character may be, can scarcely arise from any wave of wholly popular sentiment or conviction. Englishmen are not on the whole preeminent favorites in Japan; and the alliance in itself has not given them any very definite position of priority as compared with other foreigners. On the other hand, the alliance is not an unpopular connection in Japan; there is no general prejudice against it and a failure to continue it would require far more explanation than would its renewal even in an amended form. Furthermore, the alliance was originally a sort of ticket of admission to the great international game; its value may have altered or decreased; but even today it is more than an interesting souvenir. To abolish the connection with England would probably offend Japan's *amour propre*.

Moreover, among the more educated classes the alliance is distinctly popular and the intellectuals generally are in favor of its continuance and renewal. In business circles much the same feeling exists with the added idea that under cover of the alliance, with the political connection secure, Japanese economic advance in China and perhaps in Siberia will have less to fear from any British aggressive commercial policy in the Far East. Furthermore, the alliance has been useful in time past and to the Japanese there does not seem at present any vital reason for its abandonment. The military and naval groups also are much of this mind, though during the war the army in particular was by no means pro-British. Underlying such views, however, there is always the proviso that the British connection should not become a drag on Japanese policies. On more than one occasion these have been pressed without regard to the principles which are embodied in the treaties. One real test for the treaty is therefore in the observance of its professed purposes; but a large element in the support which it receives from the military and political directors of the fortunes of Japan depends on the success with which the alliance can be used to further the direct desires and designs of Japan today and tomorrow. Russia and Germany have, at least temporarily, ceased to be possible effective opponents to Japan and Great Britain in the Far East. To renew the alliance against either would, as far as Japan is concerned, be of small use; the interpretation already given to Article IV of the present treaty would seem to rule out the United States as a power against whom the alliance could be operative. A new treaty, therefore, would have its basis

in general contingencies, and in the internal condition of China and of Siberia, rather than in the existence of particular rivals or opponents.

With this in mind Japan naturally extols its own excellent services as a faithful ally in the recent war and maintains the claim that conditions, already recognized by its ally or which hitherto have not met with British opposition, cannot now be subject to review at Washington or elsewhere. At the same time, during the recent negotiations regarding the financial consortium to assist the needs of China, there was evident, on the part of Japan, a tendency to lay the emphasis on a particularistic policy in China, to revert to the idea of spheres of influence as distinguished from the idea of the Open Door. The problem of Japanese diplomacy, therefore, is how to use the issues of armaments, of immigration, and of commercial treaties in such fashion as to preserve for Japan what has been secured during the period of the alliance and, at the same time, in any new agreement, how to keep the way open for the pursuit of her previous and present policies. One suggestion has already been made, namely, to enlarge the Anglo-Japanese connection by the inclusion of the United States. Such a development would be in line with the Lansing-Ishii policy; its purpose would be to warp a new treaty so as to secure implied approval or at least apparent acquiescence as to Japanese forward policies. This indeed has been the chief utility of the British treaty of 1911; for to the Oriental world it has given the impression at least of British indifference to the outcome of Japanese military and political methods. The Japanese are frank enough in the statement of their immediate desires and necessities—they need access to the raw materials which they lack and which are abundant in China and in Siberia; they wish to find in China and in all the ports of southern Asia a retail market for their manufactured exports; and they have shown that to secure these ends and to protect themselves against hostility and undue rivalry in China they feel that they must thrust themselves into the direction of affairs. In so far as the British alliance can help Japan along these lines, there is a natural desire for its continuance.

The official view and consequently the general view on the renewal of the treaty appears in the press of 1920-21. Thus in May and June, 1920, many Japanese newspapers at first took the line that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not vital to Japan; but at the same time they

gave prominence to interviews with many leading men who spoke strongly in favor of its renewal. The present Japanese Ambassador at London, Baron G. Hayashi, ridiculed at Tokyo the idea of raising the question "at this late hour" declaring that the renewal had been under consideration for two years and that no apprehension need be felt on the matter. *Tokio Asahi* in a special article on the alliance said that the continuance of the treaty was the "chief pillar of Japan's foreign policy" and pointed also to the value of the Lansing-Ishii agreement as supplementary to the alliance in conceding Japanese rights in southern Manchuria. The conclusion was, furthermore, that "these are natural rights by the creation of geographical propinquity and not of treaties." Similarly Japanese railway interests in Manchuria "cannot be destroyed by the stroke of a pen." It is worth noting that these are the views of a paper which is by no means a military organ.⁸ Again Baron Hayashi said that the situation in China and in Siberia required the exercise of a protective influence from the outside which was possessed only by the alliance and spoke of the vital effect of the débâcle of Russia and Germany and of the rise of Bolshevik power "against which the alliance is the only barrier."⁹

A further general but very important argument in favor of the renewal of the treaty in some form or other is to be found in the sense of national self-esteem which the history of the last twenty years has so strongly fostered in Japan. At the outset, as we have seen, the treaty of 1902 met with overwhelming Japanese approval. It gave international prestige when such an element was far more important than is perhaps realized by those who today take for granted the fact that Japan is unquestionably a power of the first rank. The existence of the British alliance is interwoven with the entire history of Japan's national rise during the past twenty years. We must continue to bear in mind that any brusque or hasty abandonment of the agreement by Great Britain would undoubtedly arouse resentment in the minds of Japanese of all classes. It would appear to Japan as an attempt to block essential national aims and, if the United States were involved in such a step, the result would undoubtedly be to foster Japanese opposition to American views and interests. The importance of such contingencies might well depend

⁸ Quoted in the *London Times*, June 8, 1920.

⁹ *London Times*, June 11, 1920. Cf. also *Times*, July 14, and Dec. 24, 1920, Jan. 5, and April 9, 1921.

on the methods used and on the purposes and character of any future settlement which might be regarded as a general substitute for the present Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Certainly any western power with large Asiatic interests might prefer the good-will of Japan in Asia rather than face the danger of an even covert hostility on her part. This would be more important if the cry of Asia for the Asiatics should prevail to any extent. The so-called pan-Asiatic idea with Japan as the head and champion of such a movement has not made any great headway as yet; but that it may become a rallying point of unrest and disturbance in Asia is quite possible. There are even Chinese who frankly favor the extension of Japanese control in China at present because they prefer the reorganization of China under Asiatic guidance rather than at the hands of rival western powers.

5. THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN ASIA AND THE ALLIANCE

The existence of British interests in Asia was well in the minds of those who committed England to the Japanese agreements of 1902 and 1905. Even in the treaty of 1911 India figures in the preamble; and today the state of affairs in the Indian Empire, in central Asia, and in the Near East gives pause to the best friends of England. It is impossible here to assign praise or blame for present conditions or to attempt even to review them. Our only concern is the possible relation of such matters to the fact of the British alliance with Japan. During the negotiations of 1901 the British tried to secure the inclusion of India as a field for the operation of the proposed alliance. They failed; but in 1905 there was specific mention of the Indian frontier. Both of these moves were directed by British apprehension of the Russian menace in central Asia. In 1907, however, came the "swadeshi" movement in India. A boycott against British goods, due to native unrest and opposition to the partition of the province of Bengal, had spread, chiefly among the educated Bengali, who were Hindus by religion. This movement extended to students and agitators who had hitherto looked chiefly to England and to western Europe for their intellectual stimulus. Now, however, there was appreciation in India of the remarkable development of Japan; the results of the Russian War were in the minds of Asiatics generally; and Japan

loomed up as an Oriental leader.¹⁰ The tendency was for Indian critics of British policies to turn eastward and for the time the number of Indian students in Japanese institutions increased rapidly. Later, Indian political conspirators fled to Japan and, even during the war, a group of them found asylum there and, certainly for a time, they defied the efforts of the British to secure their arrest or expulsion. This could scarcely have been the case without the connivance of Japanese who were not above taking a special interest in such inflammable material.

As the Indian nationalist movement spread and took on revived strength at the close of the late war, conditions in India became much more serious. The Hindu nationalists, however, are not sympathetic with Japanese governmental methods and ideals. Japan is too imperial, too autocratic and militaristic to arouse enthusiasm among such radical elements in India. If the native choice as to foreign rulers in India lay between the English and the Japanese it is quite possible that the preference would be for the Japanese because they are Asiatic. Such a preference, however, would, to the ardent Indian patriot, be merely a choice between evils. On the other hand, a break between England and Japan would, in all probability, open wider the door for intrigue against the British in India and, in the event of a political conflagration in India, the attitude and policy of Japan might very well be of importance to the British. The "Russian menace" appears now in somewhat different form than in 1902. Thus General Bruce writes: "Whether a new Russian Bolshevist menace, not only to India but also Afghanistan, to Persia and possibly to Mesopotamia is not about to take the place of the old menace, time alone will show." He then queries the usefulness of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance unless that Bolshevist menace lasts.¹¹ Such military and political considerations seem, however, to be less immediate than the domestic and economic factors in India and Malaya.

The business connections of Japan and India are becoming increasingly close. The war gave special opportunity for this and, in spite of a natural reduction in the volume and extent of Japanese trade with India since the conclusion of peace, the competition of

¹⁰ Dennis, "The Indian Problem and Imperial Politics," in *Journal of Race Development*, I, 187 *et seq.*

¹¹ Bruce, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance," *Asiatic Review* (July, 1921), p. 383.

Japan for Indian trade is now far keener than before the war. Thus Japan has been supplanting Germany in the cheap trade of bangles and bottles and knickknacks of all sorts, Japanese textile industries have provided an increasing market for Indian dyes; and, of the raw cotton exports of India, Japan has been taking about 40 per cent or more than four times as much as the United Kingdom. The return has been in the marketing in India of Japanese manufactured cotton goods of the cheaper grades. This has given rise in India to complaint at the governmental assistance given to Japanese textile industries.¹² The development of Japanese business houses in India, the founding of new Japanese banks, and the presence of trade commissions have all aroused British commercial interests in India. The growth of Japanese shipping and the establishment of direct lines to India with their influence on the volume of trade has gone on apace till, today, Japanese imports into India are larger than those of any other foreign country and are second only to those of the British Empire. There are complaints as to the quality of some of these goods but the Japanese Government is doing much to foster the Indian trade.

Such competition does not make for cordial relations between the British and Japanese, at Singapore and in Malaya generally the feeling is if anything more bitter than in India; and there is a deep-seated prejudice against the so-called "Japanese invasion."¹³ During the war Japanese trade in the Straits Settlements more than doubled. Steps were therefore taken to restrict Japanese rubber holdings in the Malay Peninsula; and on all hands and in various ways the general fear of Japanese competition is manifest. Thus with regard to present conditions in the mercantile marine comes the British opinion: "Our shipping interests in the Far East are threatened to a very great degree. Japanese shipbuilding is reaching a point that it may before long become the most serious world competitor with our own. Japanese shipping is advancing by leaps and bounds."¹⁴ It is only natural in view of the close connection between Japanese business interests and national policies that such economic circumstances should have a political bearing when the question of the renewal of the alli-

¹² *Madras Times*, April 26, 1917.

¹³ *Singapore Free Press*, March 27, 1919.

¹⁴ McKenzie, "Imperial Aspects of the Far Eastern Problem," *Asiatic Review* (July, 1921), p. 422.

ance again comes up. Almost any bargain which might be struck would find its reaction in the regulation of commerce and navigation. When the alliance was first made and for many years after, Japan had chiefly her military strength to trade with; now she also has her commercial interests in the Pacific and Indian oceans to consider and to foster. These reach out under the protection of her navy to the British Dominions—to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and even to South Africa. To the representatives of these Dominions and of India as well, the whole problem of the alliance was presented in June, 1921.

6. THE "IMPERIAL CONFERENCE" OF 1921 AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Strictly speaking the conference which met in London during last June, July, and August was not an Imperial conference, as that term has been used in time past; but popular usage and the importance attached to the meeting of the Dominion premiers this year have warranted the use of that title. Originally such a conference or convention was planned for 1922; but the course of international politics and the importance of consultation with the self-governing parts of the British Empire led to the call for a conference this year. At first, in view of the organization and functions of the Imperial War Cabinet of 1917-19, and because of the special standing accorded the Dominion premiers at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 there was an inclination to describe the meeting of 1921 as an Imperial Cabinet. Thus Mr Churchill (the Secretary for the Colonies) said that the coming conference would "not be like the old Imperial Conferences, which were occasional and periodical institutions but a meeting of the regular Imperial Cabinet of the Empire." There was prompt opposition to this statement in some of the Dominions, particularly in Canada; Mr. Meighen, at Ottawa, said the use of the term was quite wrong and that the meeting in June was to be merely a conference of the premiers of the Empire. Fear was expressed lest this session in 1921 should in some way serve unduly to bind or limit the governments of the Dominions and thus to increase and strengthen in more formal ways the connection between the self-governing parts of the empire and the central authorities in London. In view of this opposition and the polemics which it aroused the use of the term

Imperial Cabinet was generally dropped in the London press.¹⁵ In the House of Commons the government, on April 28, in response to a question, said that no meeting of the Imperial Conference was contemplated this year, but a meeting on the lines of the Imperial War Cabinet meetings would come in June. The most important subjects to be discussed were the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, defense questions, arrangements for securing common Imperial policy in foreign affairs, and plans for a Constitutional Conference to be held presumably in 1922.

The official title of the meeting, therefore, became: "Conference of the Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India." The press adopted the term "Imperial Conference"; Mr. Lloyd George on at least one occasion in the House of Commons used the words "Imperial Cabinet"; and Mr. Hughes for Australia and Mr. Massey for New Zealand in their farewell interviews in August both implied that they felt they had been attending meetings of the "Imperial Cabinet." Of course the significance of this lies in the fact that the action of such a cabinet must depend, as far as any renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty is concerned, on approval and support by the respective Dominion parliaments. General usage has, however, seemed to justify the use here of the more popular term Imperial Conference; though we must not forget that in point of fact the discussion of 1911 regarding the renewal of the present alliance was before the defense committee of the conference of 1911 and not the Imperial Conference as a whole. The difference between 1911 and 1921 lies furthermore in the progress of Dominion status as to foreign affairs during these years, for in 1911 there was

¹⁵ Cf. *London Times*, April 28, 29, May 3, 1921. In the parliamentary debate at Ottawa Sir Robert Borden pointed out that Great Britain would hesitate to engage in war against strong opinion in Canada and Australia. As for the Dominions, they were faced with two alternatives: Either they had to exercise their influence to seek prevention of wars, or, in case of war (unless they withdrew from the Empire altogether), to participate in a conflict to which they might conceivably be opposed, and which their voice and influence properly directed might have prevented.

Mr. Mackenzie King, the Liberal leader, said that no steps should be taken involving any change in relations between Canada and other parts of the Empire and nothing done involving Canada in new expenditure for naval or military defense.

Mr. Meighen, the prime minister, made rather a noncommittal speech, but said nothing would be done to bind Canada until ratified by the Parliament of Canada, the Conference being merely consultative.

no question of submission of the Anglo-Japanese treaty to the Dominion parliaments. Thus during the last decade the unwritten constitution of the British Empire has been changing in our very presence.

A second point with reference to the Conference in London is its relation to the proposal for the Washington Conference. As far back as June 24, 1920, the *Peking and Tientsin Times*, which has waged a consistent war against the renewal of the alliance, prophesied that the treaty would not be renewed in July, 1921, and that a *laissez faire* policy would be adopted. This was at a time when the London *Times* correspondent in Tokyo was saying that it was taken for granted that the alliance would be renewed. In London, during the winter of 1920-21, there was comparatively little in the press regarding this aspect of the matter and undoubtedly the attitude of overworked officials was that, with European questions pressing for settlement, and with Ireland in turmoil, the Japanese treaty could wait for a time. Nevertheless, there was a marked endeavor both in public and by private conversation to impress Americans in London with the assertion that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in no way a menace to the United States. The writer recalls many occasions when that view was urged, particularly at the time of the visit of the Crown Prince of Japan. Then the *Times* had said: "We have found Japan a faithful and loyal ally, honorable in the fulfillment of her obligations and unfaltering in the confidence she has bestowed upon us" and concluded: "The British Government are necessarily debarred from making any definite statement about the future of the alliance until after the Dominion Premiers have met in London next month."¹⁰ By this time the debate on the whole subject had begun in Canada. Mr. Hughes in Australia had spoken in favor of renewal with the rider that the United States should join the alliance or that the new treaty should not offend America. Later Mr. Meighen followed General Smuts in taking a more definite stand against the treaty.

In the House of Commons an important debate took place on June 17. This definitely linked the question of competition in armaments with an adequate review of the whole situation in the Far East. Until the Imperial Conference had had opportunity to accomplish this the Japanese treaty should be extended. With this as a starting point

¹⁰ London *Times*, May 7, 1921.

the next topic was a "common Imperial foreign policy." It was impossible for England to ignore European problems or to "get loose from Europe" but Anglo-American friendship must be the basis of a British Imperial world policy. This was probably in part a comment on an earlier speech at Cape Town by General Smuts who had said. "It was impossible to continue entangled in the embroilments of Europe and the Empire should revert to the traditional policy of having no European entanglements." Regarding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance he had continued "Our paramount aim should be to secure a complete understanding with the United States and no renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty should take place unless we could satisfy the United States that no jeopardy to American interests could follow from that agreement. Imperial defence was largely a Pacific question; South African interests were only indirect." South African policy was to be one of independence but not of isolation.¹⁷ In the House of Commons this second part of General Smuts's speech received special endorsement, for Sir Samuel Hoare took up the matter saying that no Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be renewed which was likely to "embitter our relations with any one of the six commonwealths or with the United States. . . . If the Alliance is to be renewed it must be modified to meet the just demands of China." Such speeches put the entire matter clearly before the government.

In London, Mr. Chamberlain, for the Cabinet, closed the debate in the House of Commons, saying that—

He would welcome a closer association of the Dominions with us in all matters concerning the foreign policy of the Empire. He recalled that it was at a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence to which the Prime Ministers of the Dominions then in this country were summoned that Lord Grey of Falloden gave to an assembly of the Prime Ministers of the Empire the first exposition of the facts and principles upon which the foreign policy of the country was based. . . . The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement was pre-eminently a matter in which all parts of the Empire were interested. . . . It must always be a cardinal feature of British policy, to remove any misapprehension that stood in the path of our good relations with the United States and to cultivate those good relations to the utmost of our power. . . . We should be no party to any

¹⁷ *London Times*, May 23, 1921.

alliance directed against America or in which we could be called upon to act against America. He did not therefore say that any continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in a modified form was not possible. He thought it might be possible to reconcile our desire for a perfect understanding and the closest cooperation possible with the United States with a continuation of our close and intimate friendship with an ally who acted loyally when the occasion of the Alliance arose and he gave invaluable support, of which not we in Great Britain, though we too shared, but other parts of the British Empire, reaped greatest benefit during the War.¹⁵

The *Times* commented editorially three days later that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance "cannot be lightly abandoned by the signatories in the absence of a more comprehensive arrangement which would secure to both of them benefits at least which would be equally great."¹⁶ On the same day Mr. Lloyd George in his opening speech before the Imperial Conference said: "I should like to refer very briefly to one of the most urgent and important of foreign questions—the relations of the Empire with the United States and Japan. There is no quarter of the world where we desire more greatly to maintain peace and fair play for all nations and to avoid a competition of armaments than in the Pacific and in the Far East."¹⁷ He continued that with friendship for the United States as a "cardinal principle . . . we are ready to discuss with any American statesmen any proposal for the limitation of armaments which they may wish to set out."

These remarks referred particularly to the initiative which had been taken by President Harding during May, then he had independently directed informal inquiries among the great powers as to their attitude concerning a discussion on limitation of armaments. These inquiries, through the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers in Europe, had begun before the United States Senate passed unanimously a resolution authorizing and requesting the President to call a conference to discuss reduction of naval armaments. The entire subject was therefore before the public in one way or another in various parts of the world, and the United States by these informal inquiries

¹⁵ London *Times*, June 18, 1921.

¹⁶ London *Times*, June 20, 1921.

¹⁷ *Conference of Prime Ministers, etc. Summary of Proceedings and Documents* (Parl. Pap. ed No 1474), London, 1921, p 13

in May cleared the way for the later and concrete proposals of July for a much broader discussion at Washington.²¹

Returning to the meeting of the Imperial Conference we find that Mr. Hughes, of Australia, on June 21, followed the opening remarks of Mr. Lloyd George by suggesting that, with reference to the Japanese treaty, a conference of Great Britain, America, and Japan might be invoked "to ascertain what might be mutually acceptable." He then added the proposal for another conference on the limitation of armaments to which the British Government in connection with the Dominions should invite the United States, Japan, and France.²² In the course of his speech Mr. Hughes showed clearly the laudable ambition that to the Dominions should come credit for a solution of problems of such world magnitude.

A few days later, on July 7, in the House of Commons, Mr. Lloyd George said that he would prefer to wait until Monday, July 11, for replies from the United States, Japan, and China before making any statement on the Anglo-Japanese treaty.²³ And on the following Sunday, July 10, at the Prime Minister's country house, where were gathered representatives of the Dominions, the expected information from the United States was received at the hands of Mr. Harvey. This

²¹ A resolution had been introduced by Senator Borah in the Senate of the United States on January 25, 1921, calling for information as to the possibility of temporary suspension of the American naval building program, reference was also made to "any possible agreement between naval powers providing for the reduction of armaments." *Congressional Record*, 66 Cong., 3 sess., LX pt. 2, p. 1996. This resolution had followed an earlier joint resolution proposed by him that the United States should take up the question of disarmament with Great Britain and Japan with a view to a reciprocal agreement that each of the three powers should at once cut in half their annual naval appropriations for the next five years (*ibid.*, pt. 1, p. 310, Dec. 14, 1920). On April 13, 1921, Senator Borah proposed a joint conference with Great Britain and Japan which was to be called by the United States in order to enter "into an understanding or agreement by which the naval expenditures and building programs of each of the three powers shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years." (*Idem*, 67 Cong. 1 sess., p. 115, Senate Joint Resolution, 18.) Again on May 4 this resolution reappeared in the form of a proposed amendment to the annual Navy Bill; as such it was passed and became law on July 12 (*Ibid.*, p. 966. Cf. Public—No. 35, 67 Cong., H. R. No. 4803; Sec. 9.) "That the President is authorized and requested to invite the Governments of Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to a conference, which shall be charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval expenditures and building programs of each of said governments, to wit, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years to such an extent and upon such terms as may be agreed upon, which understanding or agreement is to be reported to the respective governments for approval." In this form it had already passed the Senate by a vote of 74-0.

²² *Conference of Prime Ministers*, etc., pp. 20-21.

²³ *London Times*, July 8, 1921. The official report in *Parliamentary Debates* omits the reference to the foreign powers; but there can be no question as to what the Prime Minister actually said at the time.

was given to the press in the form of an announcement of the plan for a conference to be held at Washington on limitation of armament and Pacific and Far Eastern problems:

The President, in view of the far-reaching importance of the question of limitation of armament, has approached with informal but definite inquiries the group of powers heretofore known as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, that is, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, to ascertain whether it would be agreeable to them to take part in a conference on this subject, to be held in Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon. If the proposal is found to be acceptable, formal invitations for such a conference will be issued.

It is manifest that the question of limitation of armament has a close relation to Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and the President has suggested that the powers especially interested in these problems should undertake in connection with this conference the consideration of all matters bearing upon their solution with a view to reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East. This has been communicated to the powers concerned, and China has also been invited to take part in the discussion relating to Far Eastern problems.²⁴

Thus the discussions which had taken place in the Imperial Conference and which had been prefaced by reference to the earlier American suggestions for a conference on the limitation of armaments were given a new orientation in the fresh action taken at Washington; this was due in large part to negotiations in London and Washington at the end of June and in early July. Naturally there was no mention of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the proposal of the Washington Conference, nor were the Dominions specifically named. To have included such matters in the public announcement would have been contrary to usage and a gross breach of manners on the part of the United States, for the treaty was then before the Imperial Conference, and officially the United States had nothing to do with it. In like manner the United States could not approach the British Dominions and India on this occasion except through Great Britain.

Under the circumstances matters of great importance to the British Empire were naturally postponed and transferred to the Washington Conference for further consideration. In the meantime the Imperial Conference continued its sessions. These were largely confidential and we have only the meager published summary of its proceedings, the records in the House of Commons, and the scanty reports of the press. There was less urgency in action as to the renewal or denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as, on June 30, the Lord Chan-

²⁴ *New York Times* and *London Times*, July 11, 1921.

cellor had given his opinion that the present treaty was self-extending. Already the Prime Ministers had listened to a review of foreign policy from Lord Curzon and, in more or less definite form, each had stated his views regarding the alliance. Thus on July 11, Mr. Lloyd George declared in the House of Commons that the Imperial Cabinet was guided by three main considerations

(1) In Japan we have an old and proved Ally, the Agreement of twenty years' standing between us has been of great benefit not only to ourselves and to her, but to the peace of the Far East.

(2) In China there is a very numerous people with great potentialities, who esteem our friendship highly, and whose interest we, on our side, desire to assist and advance.

(3) In the United States we see today, as we have always seen, the people closest to our own aims and ideals with whom it is for us not merely a desire and interest, but a deeply-rooted instinct to consult and cooperate

In the course of his speech he referred to a conference on Far Eastern matters as a preliminary to the conference on armament at Washington. This was due to a natural confusion; but President Harding had carefully used the words "in connection with" when linking the two matters in his proposal for a conference at Washington. The *Times* and the compiler of the summary of the Imperial Conference followed this confusion, and later there was considerable further discussion as to the possibility of taking up Far Eastern affairs at a preliminary conference at Washington instead of at London. To this idea, however, there was opposition in Canada as well as in America and the plan was dropped.²⁵ There was much

²⁵ *Conference of Prime Ministers, etc*, p. 5 London *Times*, July 12, 1921. Cf. *Montreal Star*, July 14. "It is most ardently hoped that the present views of Mr. Massey and Mr. Hughes will not be allowed to force a preliminary conference on Pacific problems in London." On the entire issue Canadian opinion, as voiced in an excellent editorial in the *Manitoba Free Press*, July 25, 1921, was in agreement with American policy and opinion. As far back as December 28, 1920, the *Toronto Globe* said "Canada, assuredly, treaty or no treaty, would feel under no obligation to come to the help of Japan against the United States. . . . The statesmen of the British Empire who are engaged in the work of safeguarding Britain's interests in the Far East doubtless understand that Canada can be no party to any international agreement which involved, even remotely, a risk so great." On July 3, 1921, the *Globe* said. "In opposing the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Mr. Meighen expresses the deliberate opinion of this country." The *Toronto Star* and the *Winnipeg Express* also supported him. The *Manitoba Free Press* said that diplomats "must justify their work not merely to their colleagues at the Foreign Office, but to the peoples and Parliaments of five British nations." The *Toronto Telegram* had criticized the anti-Japanese policy of General Smuts and Mr. Meighen as a menace to Great Britain's safety in Asia and to peace in the Pacific; and the London *Times* of June 20 warned the *Telegram* that, however willing some Dominion statesmen might be to accept renewal of the Alliance, the treaty must still come up before Dominion Parliaments.

disappointment in England and particularly among some of the Dominion premiers at this decision. It was nevertheless consistent with the ideas first expressed in June and voiced in the American announcement on July 10 of the proposed conference at Washington.²⁶ It is manifest that the expedient of a preliminary conference on Far Eastern affairs could scarcely have been adopted in fairness to Japan and to China, who would have had in any case, barely time to prepare for a conference in November; and there were other factors to be considered beside the natural desires of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Massey to attend a preliminary conference before returning to Australasia. It is also obvious that it was important to avoid creating the unfortunate impression which would have resulted from the calling of an exclusive and limited preliminary conference before the delegates of other nations had arrived. In this respect the lesson of Paris was plain. Lastly, in case an earlier and smaller meeting could not come to a satisfactory settlement of principles, the fate of the larger conference would be prejudiced.

With reference to the renewal of the alliance the position of the Dominions was made plain by remarks inside or outside the Imperial Conference; Australia, New Zealand, and India as a general principle favored renewal; Canada was opposed, South Africa was opposed to any "exclusive alliances," and General Smuts added: "To my mind it seems clear that the only path of safety for the British Empire is a path on which she can walk together with America."²⁷ Mr. Lloyd George, in the House of Commons, on August 18, gave a notable exposition of the Imperial Conference. Already he had declared "there was a time when Downing Street controlled the Empire; today the Empire is in charge of Downing Street." This he capped by saying: "You are defining life itself when you are defining the unity of the Empire"; hence it was a mistake to attempt rules and definitions as to what the British Empire meant. With reference to Japan he continued: "Is it to be suggested that we should now turn around and say you stood by us in trouble but we do not need you any longer, so, goodbye? Would any one behave like that in business? The British Empire must behave like a gentleman. It would not be becoming of the Empire so to treat a faithful ally." He then

²⁶ *London Times*, August 4, 5, and 6, 1921. *Conference of the Prime Ministers*, etc., p. 5.

²⁷ *Conference of Prime Ministers*, etc., p. 24.

suggested a new combination of England, Japan, and the United States, emphasizing particularly the importance of friendly Anglo-American relations. In the meantime the Imperial Conference had closed on August 5, and President Harding had issued on August 11, the formal invitations for the conference at Washington.

CHAPTER V

THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND JAPAN

1. THE ALLIANCE AND THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

The idea of a triple alliance or entente between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, has been frequently voiced in the British press, in the House of Commons, and in the discussions of the Imperial Conference. We find it in the Japanese press as early as 1920; and today it is common in the talk of influential unofficial Englishmen in Washington. The reason is plain for, in so far as England may be embarrassed by the opposition to the renewal of the present Anglo-Japanese treaty, the adhesion of the United States would, in the minds of many, give that alliance new life and effect. This idea was probably at the root of the British proposal for a preliminary conference on Far Eastern affairs. Certainly it would dispose of any opposition in the Dominions to the renewal of the treaty and, instead of involving any awkward denunciation of the present alliance, it really would enlarge it. Another special reason for this proposal lies in the actual situation in the Pacific.

General Smuts in his first speech before the Imperial Conference supported the ideas of many students of world politics when he said:

Undoubtedly the scene has shifted away from Europe to the Far East and to the Pacific. The problems of the Pacific are to my mind the world problems of the next fifty years or more. In these problems we are as an Empire very vitally interested. Three of the Dominions border on the Pacific; India is next door; there too are the United States and Japan. There, also, is China, the fate of the greatest human population on earth will have to be decided. There Europe, Asia and America are meeting, and there, I believe, the next great chapter in human history will be enacted.¹

¹ *Conference of Prime Ministers, etc.*, p. 25.

It is not only in China that Japanese interests are of importance for "Japanese trade expansion on a huge scale in Southern Asia, the Far East, and the Pacific is one of the really marvelous economic consequences of the World War."² Australia and New Zealand oppose Japanese immigration, but at present Japanese exports of all sorts are coming like a deluge into Australasia and the trade relations of this region of the British Empire and of Japan are of increasing importance every year. Since the war Japanese trade with the Philippines has doubled, and with the Dutch East Indies it is five times as large as in 1914.

Such facts are of particular interest to those who formerly took the equator as the southern boundary of possible Japanese expansion in the Pacific, for Japan is now copying German methods in trade as well as in military and political affairs and more and more she is resorting to economic penetration. As a method of extending her influence, as a means of legitimate business enterprise, this in itself does not concern us at present, but as a factor in the possible expansion of Japanese military and political control, economic penetration may become a totally different matter. It is from this latter point of view that this economic advance is stirring current opinion in the Far East and in Australasia; and we must not forget the older and underlying element of racial prejudice as contributing materially to general unrest in the regions of the Pacific whenever the problem of Japanese immigration comes to the front. The official figures of the Japanese census and the actual records of Japanese emigration and colonization go far to show that too much attention has been paid to the alleged problem of over-population in Japan. On the one hand, Japanese authorities have talked and written much of the need of finding an outlet for a rapidly increasing population and, on the other hand, we have in the United States and within the British Empire a vigorous domestic determination to prevent increasing Japanese immigration. The further facts are that the birth rate in Japan is now declining rapidly and that in the very regions in Asia to which Japan has devoted particular attention, Japanese colonization is but a relatively small affair. The main reasons for this last condition lie in the inability of the Japanese laborer to compete with the Chinese laborer, and in the dislike of the Japanese colonist for a cold climate.

² Bowman, *The New World* (New York, 1921), p. 495 and also p. 498.

Because of these acknowledged elements in the situation, the temptation is to view the possibilities of the future with particular attention to regions where there is no industrious Chinese competitor and where the climate is warmer or more temperate. To those who argue in such fashion the contingency of a struggle for power in the Pacific appears as naturally involving an attempt on the part of Japan to secure the Philippines and then by stages to reach the coast of northern Australia, which, except for a remote British fleet, lies almost defenseless today.

Opinion to this effect is current in the Far East, men envisage a time when Japan will be at war with the United States; they assume that, by virtue of an exempting article in a renewed Anglo-Japanese treaty, Great Britain will not be a belligerent against the United States; but they also suppose that, as a neutral, Great Britain may play the part that France took during the Russo-Japanese War when she was of considerable assistance to her ally, Russia. As the war between the United States and Japan progressed, friction as to the rights of neutrals would inevitably develop and it would be a temptation for England to intervene, in a diplomatic way, to secure peace. If such a peace came at the end of the first year of war, before America could begin to wear down Japan, it is again assumed that Japan would already be in possession of Guam and the Philippines; and these islands Japan would hope to retain at the peace. The next stage, after a period of consolidation and recuperation, would be marked by the virtual command of the western Pacific by Japan and by a Japanese advance southward by trade and immigration, or even by war, to the domination of Australasia as well.³

³ Cf. Bywater, *Sea Power in the Pacific*, pp. 288 *et seq.* The daily press at the end of October publishes reports that a decided change in British naval plans for the Far East and the Pacific is impending. Without further knowledge it is possible only to note a question in the House of Commons on October 27, 1921. Mr. Lloyd George stated that the Imperial Conference had agreed with the Admiralty that, for the better security of Great Britain's outlying possessions certain naval bases, including those in the Pacific, needed modernizing and in special cases, extending. This remark, taken in connection with press reports, suggests that a rearrangement of British naval strength is under consideration. One of the direct results of the last Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the reduction in strength of the British China squadron. This enabled concentration of naval forces in home waters and was part of the revolution in the distribution of the British navy which preceded the Great War. This was the genesis of the establishment of the grand fleet in the North Sea. Any changes in the fleet today which involve a return to earlier policies and strategy may therefore have a political aspect and deserve consideration even if only hypothetical at present. The situation in India and the general unrest

Such a hypothetical program would involve the use of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the first instance, and in the second instance its rupture or previous termination. Whatever we may imagine as to the possibility of Japanese success in the first stage of this grandiose scheme, there is nothing in the present Anglo-Japanese treaty to prevent it. Indeed the treaty provides that, short of belligerency, of actual participation in war, and up to the start of hostilities, the allies are to consult frankly and fully with each other in respect to measures necessary for the protection of interests which may be threatened. Furthermore, by Article V either ally is to profit, before war breaks out, by full and free consultation with the naval and military authorities of the other ally. This arrangement, if the treaty were observed by Great Britain and if war should ensue between the United States and Japan, would involve exchange of advice, information, and intelligence work in general up to the outbreak of war. So much for a rough sketch of the sort of talk that lies back of the anxiety in the Pacific regarding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

In more concrete fashion, however, appear some of the reasons why Australia and New Zealand are directly concerned in the present situation. The tendency is at present to regard the alliance as a protection against Japanese expansion; for the Japanese understand that the agreement would not stand the strain of a vigorous immigration policy in the southern Pacific. Such an attempt by Japan would threaten to force Australia and New Zealand and even Canada away from Great Britain as a partner of Japan. On the other hand, neither Australia nor New Zealand is anxious to contribute heavily to the maintenance of naval and military forces which would be suffi-

in Asia, when taken in connection with the fact that since 1914 the British flag has not been much in evidence in the Far East, would point to the wisdom of using an increase in naval forces in those waters as a political gesture to show that British naval power is still in being. Reports fly fast in Asia today; and the effect on public opinion of such a possible move is worth noting. In the second place, such a redistribution would always be in connection with naval policies as to the Dominions; the development of naval bases, perhaps at Singapore, as well as in Australia and New Zealand, would be part of an Imperial policy already long considered and partially effective today. A third political and naval aspect would be seen in the present discussions as to the Japanese treaty. If the alliance is to be ended it would be only natural for the British Empire to strengthen its naval position in the Far East. If a substitute for the treaty is to be produced the actual ratio of naval forces maintained in those waters would be subject to negotiation. In any case the development of naval bases should precede the movement of ships. Aside from such factors, in the event of war in the Pacific, Great Britain would wish to be sufficiently represented in the Pacific whether to protect her own neutrality or to maintain her rights.

cient to protect them completely against a possible Japanese advance. A successful war by Japan against the United States would be a serious blow to the safety of the Dominions, but to antagonize Japan at present would be to expose Australasia to the revival of the immigration question and would thus compel plans for the military and naval defense of the "White Australia" program. The better policy, therefore, from the point of view of these two Dominions is, on the one hand, to support the renewal of the alliance in such fashion as to avoid friction with the United States, and, on the other hand, to prevent the race question from rising in any awkward or provocative way. Thus the renewed treaty might become a sort of insurance against war in the Pacific. Naturally if the treaty were not renewed, the two Dominions would ask those responsible for such a result what guaranty could be offered as a substitute for the treaty.

On these lines Mr. Massey of New Zealand said on May 26, 1921, that so long as New Zealand maintains the right to determine who shall be its fellow-citizens "we have much to gain, and nothing to lose by the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty."⁴ The general view was that:

So far at least as New Zealand is concerned, the old dread of yellow immigration, though still as real and deep-seated as ever, is for the present rather latent than active. Though the proposed renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance raises issues of the profoundest possible concern to Australasia, it can not be said that the people of New Zealand are at all seriously exercised about it. . . . New Zealand has no objection whatever to the renewal of the Japanese treaty in its present form, nor is she in the least excited by the alleged endeavors of Japan to remove the bar against Asiatic immigration into Australasia.⁵

During the Imperial Conference, Mr. Massey also made it plain that he feared that the "next naval war will be fought in the Pacific" and that he had "lively and grateful remembrance of Japanese naval convoys during the last war."⁶ Later he added: "Personally, I am very strongly of opinion that an understanding between America, Japan and the British Empire would be more likely to lead to the solution of the Pacific problem than anything else that I can think of." This, he concluded, was an indispensable preliminary to disarmament.⁷

⁴ Interview in *London Times* on May 27, 1921.

⁵ *London Times—Supplement—Empire Number*, May 24, 1921.

⁶ *Conference of Prime Ministers, etc.*, pp. 26–31.

⁷ *London Times*, August 24, 1921.

For Australia, Mr. Hughes was naturally more emphatic on the subject of a "White Australia," and declared that naval defense was a "question of life and death" for Australia.

Now here is our dilemma. Our safety lies in a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. America has said she must have the greatest navy in the world, that she must have a navy sufficiently strong to defend herself. To defend herself against whom? She has left the world in no doubt as to whom. We not only have no quarrel with America, we have no quarrel with Japan. We have our ideals: Japan has hers. There is room in the world for both of us. . . . Our ideal at the Conference is, as I see it, a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in some such form, and modified if it should be deemed proper, as will be acceptable to Britain, to America, to Japan and ourselves. . . .

In the conference the idea was more fully developed as he said:

The attitude of Australia towards it (the Anglo-Japanese Alliance) has been quite clearly stated. We have not a clean slate before us. If we had to consider for the first time whether we should have a treaty with Japan, the position might be very different. We have not. For many years a treaty has existed between Japan and Britain. Its terms have been modified, but in substance the existing treaty has been in force for a long time. No doubt it cannot be renewed precisely in its present form. It must conform to the requirements of the League of Nations. But the case for renewal is very strong, if not indeed overwhelming. To Australia, as you will quite understand, this treaty with Japan has special significance. Speaking broadly, we are in favor of its renewal. . . . That (disarmament) applies, too, to the renewal or non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but in any case we must have such naval defence as is necessary for our security. The War and the Panama Canal have shifted the world's stage from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to the Pacific. The stage upon which the great world drama is to be played in the future is in the Pacific. The American Navy is now in those waters. Peace in the Pacific means peace for this Empire and for the world."

The *Times*, reviewing the entire matter on August 19, concluded that without an understanding as to the preservation of peace on the Pacific the conference at Washington could not have any real success; and Mr. Hughes on his departure from England once more spoke of the importance of the Pacific and in favor of the alliance.¹⁰

¹⁰ London *Times-Supplement—Empire Number*, May 24, 1921, quoting from a speech made by Mr. Hughes in Australia during April.

⁹ *Conference of Prime Ministers, etc*, pp. 19, 21.

¹¹ London *Times*, August 22, 1921.

2. THE ALLIANCE AND ENGLAND

Mr. Hughes spoke of an Australian dilemma, and Mr. Sastri of India has recently favored the renewal of the treaty in order "to make India safe." What of British opinion at home? Has not Great Britain an even greater dilemma? Do not the problems which the British Empire faces affect the United States and also the safety of Anglo-American relations? Mr. Lloyd George has already exposed the difficulty which perplexes the British Foreign Office. To be sure it is not so serious as would have been the case in 1905 or in 1910, if the United States had then opposed the expansion of Japan in Korea; for by the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as they stood at that time, Great Britain would have been obliged to go to war with the United States in support of Japanese claims and policies as to Korea. Today matters have changed somewhat; not only has there been an alteration in the terms and the interpretation of the present treaty but there has also developed a sense of comradeship in arms between the British Empire and the United States and better understanding between England and America. Nevertheless the dilemma still exists for England. During the past few months she has also found that within the empire there is considerable difference of opinion regarding the proper British foreign policy to be observed in this definite and important matter. As the *Times* pointed out it was fortunate that the Dominion premiers were in London when the invitation for the Washington Conference came, but that invitation did not reconcile those differences. For this reason the affairs and problems of the British Empire travel across the Atlantic and the Pacific to Washington for assistance and action which may simplify the solution of such internal questions. Thus the *Montreal Star* asks whether the Dominions are "millstones or keystones" to the British Empire and adds that they "must determine whether they are to be a strength or a stumbling block to British foreign policy." The *Times*, with a better horizon than is common in the English press, says

Before the war the British Government could act for the Dominions in foreign affairs without any great risk of misrepresenting them in any serious way. Now that risk is inherent in almost any action which the British Government may take without recent knowledge of the views on international affairs of the Dominion Governments. But peace problems since the war have revealed a difference in grain between the Downing Street view of many international questions and the view which is natural in Ottawa or in Melbourne or in Pretoria.¹¹

¹¹ Quoted in the *London Times*, August 5, 1921

and it is important that the London tradition of preoccupation in Europe and "its fevered Eastern frontiers" should be corrected by Dominion ideas regarding the importance of the world outside of Europe.¹² Such views, however, do not obscure the fact that there has been division of opinion among the Dominions as to the renewal of the Japanese treaty. The invitation to Washington entirely altered the angle from which the prime ministers approached the matter; the alliance continued and "its future obviously depends very largely upon the result of the Washington Conference."¹³ Thus an even larger dilemma is still with us. There are differences within the Empire but the wider issue is as to the external problem—the relations of Great Britain to Japan and to the United States. The choice is still to be made as to treaty renewal, with or without modifications, as to treaty denunciation, or as to the birth of a substitute for the treaty in some agreement to be produced at Washington. And over the whole matter lies the transcendent interest of Anglo-American relations.

The approach to such matters at the conclusion of such a small historical review starts from the first fact that the alliance is already in being; it was first concluded in 1902 and has been renewed twice; it has therefore almost attained its majority. The burden of argument, from the British point of view, rests with those who oppose its continuance or renewal.

Add to this the second fact that in common with other governments Great Britain has a foreign office where precedent has its due weight; the natural inertia which affects a great department of public affairs in any state is a factor for conservatism, for unwillingness to alter a condition already established. The British Foreign Office is no exception, and, though there may be differences of personal opinion within the staff, there is a general weight of experience and of caution in favor of the present treaty. This certainly has been shown in the failure definitely to settle the matter long before. Nevertheless the importance of cordial relations with America is also a deep conviction and an ever active factor in the determination of British policies. Of that there can be no doubt.

¹² *London Times*, August 4, 1921.

¹³ *London Times*, August 5, 1921.

American affairs and policies, however, are not the only consideration; the vast commitments of the British nation in every continent and particularly the varied political and economic interests of England in Asia have a vital place in British policy especially at this time. These interests are due, in part, to the recent war and to the state of unrest which afflicts us all; they are also, in part, ancient, and historically wrapped with the very existence of the Empire. To these complicated and dangerous matters the American public is in large part a stranger. Nevertheless, the general condition of British affairs in Asia, the peril of revolt in India, the instability of the Near East, the menace of Russian intrigue in central Asia and even on the very frontiers of India are all lively, present elements in the British world. Consequently, in the third place, in so far as the Japanese alliance has been of assistance to England, inasmuch as it has added to a sense of security in the Far East during these years of stress and strain, the feeling is naturally against a change without sufficient reason. Therefore the British diplomat who sees the situation through anxious, Indian and Afghan glasses says—why should we run the risk of additional difficulties by throwing over a connection which has been of some use to us in time past? Even if the Japanese alliance has been negative in value why should we now prefer the possibility of a positive risk by incurring the resentment of a sensitive people and of a first-class power which is proud of the strongest navy and army in Asia?

A fourth element exists in the apparent fact that India and New Zealand are frankly in favor of the treaty, that Australasia generally supports it with only two reservations, to both of which England is already agreed, viz., that war with the United States under the terms of the treaty should be made plainly impossible and that the immigration question should not be involved. Furthermore, South Africa opposes the renewal only on principle, because it is an exclusive agreement and because of the remote possibility of war with America. Canada alone has taken anything like an independent stand against the entire treaty. It is quite possible that, with suitable and necessary modifications, even her objections might disappear. Since there is a considerable chance that England can smooth out these differences within the Empire, why should she now reject the probability of a modified treaty? On the other hand, if England should decide to denounce the agreement, would not that involve much more

serious difficulties with the Dominions who are in favor of renewal and impose more serious responsibilities and heavier expenditures for defense on all parts of the Empire which may be exposed to possible Japanese enmity and resentment '.

In the fifth place, as to the League of Nations and the spirit of the Covenant, which is so opposed to exclusive and limiting alliances both England and Japan by their joint notes of July, 1920, and July, 1921, have shown their desire to bring the alliance into conformity with the provisions and rulings of the League of Nations. In any case, could the League of Nations at present give the two allies the security and support which either might need in the Far East, or elsewhere in Asia, or on the Pacific? Is there anything in the League of Nations which would lead England to give up her association with Japan, a fellow-member of the league? '.

Sixthly, as we recall the great differences of race, color, and religion which exist within the British Empire and in view of delicate and thorny problems of race contact, is not the fact that England has an Asiatic ally in Japan an added though possibly indirect element in helping the British to hold an even and just hand as to racial matters within the empire? Certainly the fact of the alliance serves to show that at London there is no false pride or prejudice on such matters.

Seventhly, since friendship for the United States is a "cardinal principle of British foreign policy" and since there is danger of friction between the United States and Japan, the position of England as an ally of Japan gives her a special right and opportunity, without danger of misunderstanding and without danger of incurring charges as an international meddler, to act as the friend of both countries and to try to prevent serious trouble between Japan and the United States. Is it not better for England to try to restrain any possible aggressive or annoying policies on the part of Japan? Thus while remaining Japan's ally, England could make for the peace of the world.

In the eighth place, in case the alliance were given up and no other satisfactory agreement were substituted for it, where would England look for an efficient friend capable of world-wide action? No European power can at present exactly take the place of Japan; the United States has refused to join the League of Nations and has made a separate peace with Germany. In any case, the United States has

hitherto been opposed to any alliances, and it is only an alliance with America that could take the place of the present British agreement with Japan. If, however, a suitable joint international agreement should appear in the course of time might not the existence of the Anglo-Japanese treaty be a medium, a bridge toward that sort of a general accord? Such an international convention would of necessity include Great Britain and Japan and their partnership might give added strength, and a trend toward peace, particularly if the United States should also become a party to such an agreement.

Ninthly, in view of the complicated economic questions which center about China and which are also common to Asia, the fact of a political partnership with Japan is an element making for cooperation, it would reduce the danger of friction due to natural business competition.

Lastly, Mr. Lloyd George has already pointed out the embarrassment to England of merely saying "good bye" to Japan at the end of a war in which Japan took part as an efficient ally, and particularly after peace negotiations in which she loyally supported British contentions and diplomacy. Would not such a decision strike at British honor and gratitude and make for instability and uncertainty in the reputation as well as in the realities of British foreign policy?

These are some of the reasons which have been advanced or which might be brought forward in support of the continuance of the alliance. Undoubtedly there are others; but, if we consider the matter exclusively from the British point of view and with due regard to the immensity and the variety of interests involved, these reasons and these queries deserve consideration.

3. JAPANESE ALARMS AND UNCERTAINTIES

The chief reasons for the renewal or continuance of the alliance as seen in Japan have already appeared.¹⁴ It is necessary only to recall them and to give them their place in a Japanese brief for the alliance. A number of these general reasons are similar to the British reasons, and do not need further explanation. Thus there is, in the first place, the historical weight and precedent of the three successive treaties, and, secondly, the presumption for renewal or continuance

¹⁴ Cf. chap I, sec 1, chap IV, sec 4; and chap V, sec. 1

of the alliance unless new and forthcoming arguments appear on the negative side of the question. Thirdly, there is the unquestioned past usefulness of the connection; this has been shown on repeated occasions during the past twenty years both in political affairs and indirectly in a military way. Fourthly, as the economic ambitions of Japan, as well as her necessities, make for an active policy in continental Asia and thereby rouse opposition and competition, the value of the political and military support of England may become greater. In the fifth place, the condition of China and the perils arising from domestic disturbances on the mainland give the treaty a special importance in the event of intervention in China becoming necessary or desirable for Japan.

A sixth reason is that the alliance is made between two island powers to both of whom the problems of sea power, of birth rate, of the need of supply of raw materials and of markets for finished products are familiar and incessant. From the point of view of practical experience Japan can appeal to the knowledge and sympathy of England. Arising from this element is a seventh query, for to whom would Japan turn for understanding and support in such problems rather than to England? The alliance has become in many ways a sort of touchstone of success with Japan and, if she did not have the British connection, she would be practically isolated. The attack on the alliance therefore appears as part of an attempt to encircle her and limit her national policies. Before the war Japan might with very good reason have turned to Germany or to Russia. For the time being such choices do not seem possible or profitable; hence at present the Anglo-Japanese Alliance stands without an alternative, unless, as has been suggested, the conference at Washington should provide another way of effective association.

An eighth factor is the unrest from which the whole world seems now to suffer. If the vigorous campaign of Bolshevism in the Near East, in Persia, in the central Asian Khanates, in India, and in Mongolia should extend more persistently to the Far East, the stability of Japan, her international position as well as her domestic peace, might be involved; consequently this is not the time to abandon a foreign connection which gives security and support.

Furthermore and ninthly, the alliance has served as a useful shield in matters financial and public. It has helped Japan to deal as an

equal in international finance; at the same time, it has given a diplomatic cover for action and policies, which might not have been so successful if seen naked before the world. Lastly, in spite of frequent attacks on the British alliance in the Japanese press, in spite of national satisfaction and self-sufficiency, there is the reason of prestige—the value of the alliance at least as a decoration if not always as a tangible asset. It is one of “the imponderables” in the Asiatic world and an element of “good-will” in the international balance sheet of Japan. Such a rough and hasty picture may not do full justice to Japanese arguments; but underneath the whole matter lies the fact that, without regard to the exact terms of the treaty, the alliance presupposes the moral support of England for Japanese policies against the policies of any other country, whether it be China or the United States. That has been of greater value to Japan during the past few years than any military or naval assistance that England might have offered. It is such general acquiescence and moral support that Japan needs today.

4. CRITICISM OF THE ALLIANCE

The movement against the renewal or continuation of the present Anglo-Japanese treaty is international in character and is by no means the result of any long agitation in America or of any formal stand by the United States. Many of the grounds for this opposition are to be found in matters which are themselves outside the exact terms or even the proper scope of the alliance.¹⁵ They naturally extend to political and economic factors which, in turn, are vital to military and naval policies and preparations. As such these reasons against the alliance lie at the root of those ideals of international coöperation by which peace and accord may be secured. But arguments and criticisms of this sort do not necessarily provide any hard and fast program; they are not in the least an attempt to define the precise ways and means by which success may be won in forthcoming negotiations. Those turn on many issues and questions of which the Anglo-Japanese treaty is only one. There is therefore at this time no proposal of a substitute for the treaty; that is beyond the scope of this review. Moreover, the exact value and weight of each of these criticisms may depend in part on the character of any alternatives to the alliance, for

¹⁵ Cf. chap. III, secs. 5–9, chap. IV, secs. 1, 3–6; and chap. V, sec. 1.

it is not impossible that substitutes for the present treaty might be open to objections far more serious than those advanced against the alliance as it now stands.

The first criticism of the treaty naturally comes from Japan, for it is there that the alliance has been most bitterly attacked. The query is as to its usefulness and necessity. Against whom must Japan now defend herself and is the alliance with England best adapted to her national desires and policies? Does not the alliance involve sacrifices beyond any possible returns? As far as America is concerned, Japan knows that the treaty is comparatively useless, for the United States is outside the actual belligerent scope of the alliance in the event of war by America against Japan. Germany and Russia are at present helpless to wage an offensive war in the Far East and no other European power can attack Japan. Does Japan need the help of England to face the chaotic and helpless China? In the world of real politics here are practical questions which have not failed to appear in the Japanese press.

From a different angle, but with the same negative result, Lord Northcliffe has very recently said: "During the past two years I have been gradually coming to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese alliance has outrun its usefulness."¹⁶ The British Government has already discovered that the question of the renewal of the treaty has provoked division of opinion within the Empire. In the text of the treaty England has expressed adherence to principles of American policy as regards China; and no one supposes, unless those principles are deliberately violated by Great Britain, that an Asiatic alliance would be useful to England as against America. These are ideas which have also affected American opinion so that men are frankly asking—what is the need of the alliance? This is only natural as we read, alongside of Lord Northcliffe's, resolutions of the British trade unions directed against the alliance, and find the radical press in England equally frank.

. . . The first essential is to end the Japanese Alliance. British public opinion has been culpably slow to understand this issue. Everyone realizes, of course, that we must not promise to back the Japanese in the event of war with America. But the real issue is whether we are going to continue to back Japan in her reckless career of expansion. The Alliance has served to cover and protect the annexation of Korea, the occupation of Manchuria, the push into

¹⁶ *New York Times*, Oct 27, 1921

Mongolia, the seizure of Vladivostok, the grabbing of Shantung, and much else of a less startling but equally objectionable kind. As Allies we cannot oppose, and must give at least moral, which might easily become material support . . .¹⁷

From very different points of view General Bruce and now Mr. Bywater, as a naval expert, query the efficiency of the connection, thus: "It is very true, as her (Japanese) publicists said in 1916, and have repeated many times since, that Japan must face the Pacific problem alone and solve it unaided."¹⁸ This is plain British talk and the Japanese, in this respect and to this extent, are also right.

A second point against the alliance arises from the fact that both partners are members of the League of Nations. As we have seen they have both shown their desire to submit their private and exclusive alliance to the judgment of the league, for they question whether it is "entirely consistent with the spirit of the League Covenant." This action may result in internment, if not interment, for the league has not given any opinion. In the meantime, the alliance continues in effect subject to possible revision in order to avoid conflict between the treaty of alliance of 1911 and the Treaty of Versailles, which both England and Japan signed in 1919. Certainly the intention of those responsible for the Covenant and for Section X of the treaty of 1919 was to offer the shield of the league as a substitute for private defensive alliances in preventing war. If that intention is upheld effectively the Anglo-Japanese treaty may become from an international point of view an unnecessary document. Its continuance would in that case be an open assertion of disbelief in the League of Nations and certainly would show a disregard of its spirit. Against that contingency the allies took an initial step in their note of July, 1921. There is, however, in the field of political opinion another aspect of the matter; for, generally speaking, the organization of the league was supposed to mark a break with the traditions and policies of the older diplomacy which is so well illustrated in the origin, provisions, and history of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The fact of this controversy as to its continuance and renewal is, from an international point of view and from the point of view of members of the league, a stimulant to the revival of a debate which only recently seriously affected the progress of peace. The United States is not a member

¹⁷ *London Nation*, XXX, no. 2, October 8, 1921, pp. 42-3.

¹⁸ Bywater, *Sea-Power in the Pacific*, p. 311. Cf. also chap. XI; and for Bruce, *Asiatic Review* (July, 1921), p. 383.

of the League of Nations; but American opinion, in so far as it is suspicious of the treaty of alliance as a symptom of unhealthy international conditions, is in line with British and Japanese suspicions regarding the wisdom and validity of the provisions of the treaty as compared with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Thirdly, as we recall the political struggle in the United States over the Treaty of Versailles, it is plain that, outside as well as inside Congress, the results of the Peace Conference at Paris which aroused the bitterest American criticism were those affecting the settlement in the Far East. They were opposed because of their character and because by their origin, in the exchange of secret notes between Japan and the Allies in February, 1917, these provisions as to Shantung and the Pacific islands savored of the very methods and principles which had long been foreign to American diplomacy. The support given to Japan at Paris by these secret notes of 1917 naturally made a section of American opinion doubtful of the professions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The general result was to strengthen immeasurably the feeling that the United States did not wish to have anything to do with that sort of European diplomacy. If such settlements were possible under the aegis of the Anglo-Japanese agreement, or as an indirect and supplementary effect of that connection, the inclination was strong to cry "a plague on both your houses," withdraw from participation in European affairs as far as possible, and view the Asiatic situation with special attention and concern.

A fourth ground of opposition to the alliance is the attitude of China. Instead of cordial and friendly relations between China and the two allies we find suspicion and fear on the part of Chinese who were formerly friendly to both governments. In the Far East the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has become anathema to intelligent and patriotic Chinese whether they are supporters of the Peking or of the Canton governments. The British interests in China also see this fact with increasing uneasiness; they have made it plain by resolutions of chambers of commerce, and in the British press, that they are opposed to the renewal of the treaty, at least in its present form.¹⁹

Fifthly, the alliance has, from the first, been an elastic insurance policy for Japan. In the event of trouble she felt she could count either on the active assistance of England or, at least, on a benevolent British neutrality; at all events England would not be against her in

¹⁹ Cf. chap. IV, secs. 3 and 5.

the Far East. Such a feeling has acted as a stimulant to Japanese forward policies. To some of these, whether protected by the terms of the alliance or outside of its provisions, there is no reason to object; to other achievements and plans there has been and still is decided opposition in various quarters. The feeling is that Japan would not have disregarded certain general lines of American policy with regard to China if it had not been for the encouragement given her by the existence of her alliance with England. It is unnecessary and impossible to enter into details at present; but the net result is the strong feeling that, under cover of the alliance, the peace of the world is being threatened. Unfortunately there is an absolutely unfounded belief in certain circles in Japan that the United States is aggressive and that we have imperialistic designs on China. Nothing could be further from the truth. The attempt by some Japanese to make use of such an idea as a defense for their own military and political expansion shows blindness to the realities of world politics and of American policies today. The alliance remains, however, a dangerous factor in the situation.

A sixth point comes from the attempted violations of the spirit of the agreement as suggested by its provisions. When the statement is made that the Twenty-one Demands, as first presented to China, are not in opposition to the general intent of the Anglo-Japanese treaty the question at once arises as to whether the agreement is itself hypocritical and misleading or whether in such matters the connection has been already damaged beyond repair. The preambles of the three treaties stated their purposes, the history and events of the last twenty years are in some respects directly in contravention of those provisions. It is therefore the uncertainty which exists with regard to the real meaning as distinguished from the textual provisions of the treaty that makes for criticism, suspicion, and misunderstanding.

Such considerations lead directly to a seventh factor, viz., that no alliance can stand motionless. To live and to remain effective it must march with events and be quick to catch new currents of air in international life and thought. Thus the circumstances which produced the treaty of 1902 and which provided for its renewals belong in large part to another period. Today the alliance is too old; it has served its purpose. If its provisions remain essentially unchanged and if the observance of its precepts continue as doubtful as hitherto,

the Anglo-Japanese treaty will no longer be in harmony with the circumstances of the present. In America there is a tendency toward benevolent optimism when new and liberal forces make their appearance. We are often too easily moved to believe that the new world is at our doors, thus there was a wave of enthusiasm in America when the Chinese Republic was proclaimed ten years ago. The events of the last decade have given us pause as we realize some of the unchanging qualities of Asiatic politics. The lessons and inevitable disillusionments of Paris are still with us as we look about the world today. Nevertheless a change has taken place in some respects and the opportunity has again come to Americans, as well as to others, to reaffirm their belief in the friendly association of nations, in the principle of international cooperation, and to declare their opposition to particular and exclusive combinations and alliances. The weight of progressive liberal thought in world politics today is directed against the very conditions and ideas which are interwoven in the actual life history of the alliance.

This strong opinion can find support today among liberal groups the world over, in Japan as well as in South Africa. We have, however, to deal with realities while we cherish our ideals. One of the highest of our ideals is the promotion of Anglo-American friendship and understanding, and the reality today is that, by forces not of our choosing, the efficiency of that association and partnership between the two nations comes once more to the stage of discussion and negotiation. The last ground of criticism of the alliance therefore rests in the fear lest, in the present state of affairs, the treaty and the arguments about it might affect the opportunity which is now open to both America and the British Empire to strike hands. It is a serious matter to raise such a question or doubt; it would be worse to ignore it. The real test today depends on the community of thought and purpose, the common international morality, and the character and effect of actual cooperation which both states can establish and maintain. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has unfortunately become a possible stumbling block in a march along the same road. That fact is in itself sufficient to cause anxiety and to give additional weight to all the other objections which have been stated or might have been offered against it. The balance for and against the treaty is now familiar; the way out of the difficulty must be found by the decisions taken in the Conference at Washington.

APPENDIX I

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATIES

A. TREATY OF 1902¹

The governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the Extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:

ARTICLE I. The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized the independence of China and of Corea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

ART. II. If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

¹ MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China*, 1894-1919, (New York, 1921), I, 324-25. 2 vols.

ART. III. If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ART. IV. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

ART. V. Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

ART. VI. The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 30th day of January, 1902.

(L. S.) (Signed) LANSDOWNE,
*His Britannic Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.*

(L. S.) (Signed) HAYASHI,
*Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the
Emperor of Japan at the Court of
St. James.*

B. TREATY OF 1905²

PREAMBLE

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following articles, which have for their object:

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:

ARTICLE I. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

ART. II. If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers either Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ART. III. Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Corea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

ART. IV. Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right

² MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China*, 1894-1919, I, 516-18.

to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

ART. V. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

ART. VI. As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

ART. VII. The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

ART. VIII. The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto their Seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 1905.

(L. S.) LANSDOWNE,

His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(L. S.) TADASU HAYASHI,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty The Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.

C. TREATY OF 1911³

PREAMBLE

The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 12th August, 1905, and believing that a revision of that Agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said Agreement, namely;

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:

ARTICLE I. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

ART. II. If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either High Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ART. III. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

³ MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China*, 1894-1919, I, 900-901.

ART. IV. Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

ART. V. The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

ART. VI. The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement, and have affixed thereto their Seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 13th day of July, 1911.

E. GREY,

*His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.*

TAKAAKI KATO,

*Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the
Court of St. James.*

APPENDIX II

THE FOUR POWER PACT

A treaty between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Japan, signed December 13, 1921, relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean.

The United States of America, the British Empire, France and Japan, with a view to the preservation of the general peace and the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean, have determined to conclude a treaty to this effect and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America, Charles Evans Hughes, Henry Cabot Lodge, Oscar W. Underwood and Elihu Root, citizens of the United States;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India: The Right Honorable Arthur James Balfour, O.M., M.P., Lord President of His Privy Council; The Right Honorable Baron Lee of Fareham, G.B.E., K.C.B., First Lord of His Admiralty; The Right Honorable Sir Auckland Campbell Geddes, K.C.B., His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America; and

For the Dominion of Canada: The Right Honorable Robert Laird Borden, G.C.M.G., K.C.;

For the Commonwealth of Australia: The Honorable George Foster Pearce, Minister of Defence;

For the Dominion of New Zealand: Sir John William Salmond, K.C., Judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand;

For the Union of South Africa: The Right Honorable Arthur James Balfour, O.M., M.P.;

For India: The Right Honorable Valingman Sankaranarayana Srinivasa Sastri, Member of the Indian Council of State;

The President of the French Republic: Mr. René Viviani, Deputy, Former President of the Council of Ministers; Mr. Albert Sarraut, Deputy, Minister of the Colonies; Mr. Jules J. Jusserand, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States of America, Grand Cross of the National Order of the Legion of Honour;

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan: Baron Tomosaburo Kato, Minister of the Navy, Junii, a member of the First Class of the Imperial Order of the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun with the Paulownia Flower; Baron Kijuro Shidehara, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Washington, Joshii, a member of the First Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun; Prince Iyesato Tokugawa, Junii, a member of the First Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun; Mr. Masanao Hanihara, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jushii, a member of the Second Class of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun;

Who, having communicated their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

I.

The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

If there should develop between any of the High Contracting Parties a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy and is likely to affect the harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.

II.

If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with

one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

III.

This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the time it shall take effect, and after the expiration of said period it shall continue to be in force subject to the right of any of the High Contracting Parties to terminate it upon twelve months' notice.

IV.

This Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect on the deposit of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington, and thereupon the agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded at London on July 13, 1911, shall terminate. The Government of the United States will transmit to all the Signatory Powers a certified copy of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications.

The present Treaty, in French and in English, shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to each of the Signatory Powers.

In faith whereof the above named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at the City of Washington, the thirteenth day of December, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-one.

Signed by all the Plenipotentiaries named above.

DECLARATION ACCOMPANYING THE ABOVE FOUR- POWER TREATY

In signing the Treaty this day between The United States of America, The British Empire, France and Japan, it is declared to be the understanding and intent of the Signatory Powers:

1. That the Treaty shall apply to the Mandated Islands in the Pacific Ocean; provided, however, that the making of the Treaty shall not be deemed to be an assent on the part of the United States of

America to the mandates and shall not preclude agreements between The United States of America and the Mandatory Powers respectively in relation to the mandated islands.

2. That the controversies to which the second paragraph of Article I refers shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective Powers.

Washington, D. C., December 13, 1921.

Signed by all the Plenipotentiaries named above.

A TREATY BETWEEN THE SAME FOUR POWERS, SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE ABOVE, SIGNED FEBRUARY 6, 1922

The United States of America, the British Empire, France and Japan have, through their respective Plenipotentiaries, agreed upon the following stipulations supplementary to the Quadruple Treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921:

The term "insular possessions and insular dominions" used in the aforesaid Treaty shall, in its application to Japan, include only Karafuto (or the Southern portion of the island of Sakhalin), Formosa and the Pescadores, and the islands under the mandate of Japan.

The present agreement shall have the same force and effect as the said Treaty to which it is supplementary.

The provisions of Article IV of the aforesaid Treaty of December 13, 1921, relating to ratification shall be applicable to the present agreement, which in French and English shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States, and duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Contracting Powers.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present agreement.

Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of February, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-two.

Signed by all the Plenipotentiaries named above, except Viviani and Tokugawa, absent.

SENATE RESERVATION

At the end of the resolution of ratification of the Supplementary Treaty above, passed by the United States Senate by a vote of 73-0 on March 27, 1922, the following reservation was added to said resolution of ratification:

“Subject to the following reservation and understanding, which is hereby made a part of and condition of this resolution of ratification and which repeats the declaration of intent and understanding made by the representatives of the powers signatories of the four power treaty relating to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the Pacific Ocean:

1. That the four-power treaty relating to Pacific possessions shall apply to the mandated islands in the Pacific Ocean: provided, however, that the making of this treaty shall not be deemed to be an assent on the part of the United States of America to the mandates and shall not preclude agreements between the United States of America and the mandatory powers respectively in relation to the mandated islands.

2. That the controversies to which the second paragraph of Article I of the four-power treaty relating to Pacific possessions refers shall not be taken to embrace questions which according to principles of international law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective powers.”

From the Congressional Record for March 28, 1922.

APPENDIX III

READING LIST

This is not a bibliography; nor a list of books used in the preparation of this pamphlet. It is merely a selection of convenient books which, by way of content or comment, bear particularly on questions touched upon in this historical sketch of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Articles in periodicals have not been included. There are many of great value in publications such as *Asia*, the *Asiatic Review*, the *Round Table*, the *Atlantic Monthly*, the *Contemporary Review*, the *Fortnightly Review*, the *New Republic*, etc.

MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China*, 1894-1919 (New York, 1921), is now the standard collection of essential documentary material for the recent diplomatic history of the Far East. 2 vols.

Abbott, James F., *Japanese Expansion and American Policies*. New York, 1916.

Bland, J. O. P., *China, Japan and Korea*. New York, 1921.

Bowman, I., *The World Today*. New York, 1921.

Brown, Arthur Judson, *The Mastery of the Far East*. New York, 1919.

Bywater, Hector C., *Sea Power in the Pacific*. Boston and New York, 1921.

Cheng, Sih-Gung, *Modern China, a Political Study*. Oxford, 1919.

Chung, Henry, *The Oriental Policy of the United States*. New York, etc., 1919.

Fletcher, C. Brunson, *The Problem of the Pacific*. New York, 1919.

Gibbons, Herbert A., *New Map of Asia*. New York, 1921.

Gleason, George, *What Shall I Think of Japan?* New York, 1921.

Hall, H. Duncan, *The British Commonwealth of Nations*. London, 1920.

Hornbeck, Stanley K., *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*. New York, 1916.

- Iyenaga, T., and Kenoske Sato, *Japan and the California Problem*. New York, etc., 1921.
- Kawakami K. K., *Japan and World Peace*. New York, 1919.
- . *Japan and World Politics*. New York, 1917.
- Keith, Arthur B., *Responsible Government in the Dominions*. Oxford, 1912.
- . *War Governments in the Dominions*. Oxford, 1921.
- Latourette, Kenneth S., *Development of Japan*. New York, 1918.
- McGovern, W. M., *Modern Japan*. New York, Chicago, 1920.
- Millard, Thomas F., *Democracy and the Eastern Question*. New York, 1919.
- Mousley, Edward O., *An Empire View of an Empire Tangle*. London, 1921.
- Murray, Gilbert, *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey*. Oxford, 1915.
- Osborne, Sidney, *The New Japanese Peril*. New York, 1921.
- Pitkin, W. B., *Must We Fight Japan?* New York, 1921.
- Pooley, A. M., *Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi*. London, 1915.
- Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik, 1888–1914*. Berlin, 1916.
- Scholefield, Guy H., *The Pacific, Its Past and Future, and the Policy of the Great Powers from the Eighteenth Century*. London, 1919.
- Seymour, Charles, *The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870–1914*. New Haven, 1914.
- Smith, C. A. M., *The British in China and Far Eastern Trade*. London, 1920.
- Tardieu, André, *France and the Alliances*. New York, 1908.
- Treat, Payson J., *Japan and the United States*. Boston, 1921.
- Vinacke, Harold M., *Modern Constitutional Development in China*. Princeton, 1920.
- Weale, B. L. Putnam, *The Truth about China and Japan*. New York, 1919.
- Willoughby, Westel W., *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*. Baltimore, 1920.